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FIDUCIARY FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
* Evan J. Criddle 
An enduring challenge for administmtive law is the tension between the ideal 
of democratic policymaking and the ubiquity of bureaucratic discretion. This Article 
seeks to reframe the problem of agency discretion by outlining an interpretivist 
model of administrative law based on the concept of fiduciary obligation in private 
legal relations such as agency, trust, and corporation . Administrative law, like pri-
vate fiduciary law, increasingly relies upon a tripartite framework of entrustment, 
residual control, and fiduciary duty to demarcate a domain of bounded agency 
discretion. To minimize the risk that agencies will abuse their entrusted discretion 
through opportunism or carelessness , administrative law empowers the political 
branches to exert limited residual control over agencies and subjects agencies to 
nonderogable duties of care and loyalty. As an interpretivist theory, this fiduciary 
model helps to explain controversial features of administrative law such as the 
contemporary nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference, and the limits of presi-
dential control over agency action. By clarifying administrative law's internal 
dynamics and implicit ambitions, the fiduciary model also provides a blueprint for 
reform in critical areas such as the standing doctrine and the due process restraints 
on agency discretion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Enthusiasts have hailed the rise of the modem administrative state as "the 
triumph of legitimate, liberal governance in a world full of dangerous alter-
natives."1 There is much to commend this view. Legislative enactments such 
as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA)3 have greatly enhanced the administrative state's 
transparency, formal rationality, and procedural fairness. Courts in the United 
States have followed the U.S. Congress's lead, demanding that agencies 
provide increasingly detailed and persuasive justifications for their discre-
tionary policy decisions. Yet, at the same time that legislators and judges have 
been dutifully fine-tuning agency procedure, legal theory's shifting currents 
1. Jerry L. Mashaw, SmaU Things Like Reasons Are Put in a]ar: Reason and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 27 (2001). 
2. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) . 
3. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000)) . 
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have gradually eroded the administrative state's conceptual foundations, 
precipitating a "crisis of legitimacy" in administrative law.4 
Over the past century, administrative law scholars developed a variety of 
theories for reconciling agency policymaking with the core principles of our 
constitutional democracy. Early apologists envisioned Congress as the source 
of all regulatory policy and characterized agencies either as mere transmission 
belts for legislative directives or as dispassionate experts capable of translating 
Congress's generalist instructions into specialized regulatory regimes. 1 As legal 
realism dampened enthusiasm for these technocratic theories of agency 
action, new theories arose to take their place, each reflecting a vision of 
agencies as political institutions embedded in the political process. The "inter-
est representation" model emerged in the 1970s, emphasizing agencies' role as 
facilitators of public deliberation and characterizing agency notice-and-
comment rulemaking as a microcosm of the democratic process.6 More 
recently, proponents of enhanced legislative oversight and executive power 
have advanced "political-control"7 and "unitary-executive',a models of the 
administrative state, seeking to anchor agency policymaking to the political 
branches' constitutional and popular mandates. Each of these models has 
aspired to reconcile agency administration with liberal constitutional values 
4. Peter H. Schuck, Introduction , in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (Peter H. 
Schuck ed., 1994); see, e.g., jOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980) ; 
)AMES 0. FREEDMAN , CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 78 (1978). 
5. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1675-78 (1975); see also Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and ]uaicial Review, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 505, 577-78 (1985) (describing these models); Robert B. Reich , Public Administration and 
Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay , 94 YALE L.J . 1617, 1618 (1985) ("In the half-century 
prior to the end of W orld War II , most Americans viewed public administrators as experts who 
used their experience and training to discover the best means for attaining goals established by 
statute. The administrator's task was merely to solve the problems identified by democratic 
processes; the legitimacy of his role was no major issue.") (citation omitted). 
6. Stewart, supra note 5, at 1760--61; see also Garland, supra note 5, at 579 ("The interest 
representation model evolved in response to widespread disillusionment with both the 
'transmission belt ' and 'expertise' models of administrative action."); Reich, supra no te 5, at !620 
("The job of the public administrator, according to this vision, was to accommodate-to the 
extent possible-the varying demands placed upon government by competing groups. The public 
administrator was a referee, a skillful practitioner of negotiation and compromise."). 
7. See e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War 
Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 ( 1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry 
R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 
(1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast , The Political Origins of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, IS J.L. ECON. & ORG. !80 (1999) . 
8. See, e.g. , Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 
48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995) ; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural judiciary, lOS HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). 
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and rationalize administrative procedures by tracing agency policy to specific 
directives from Congress, the president, or the people as a whole. 
In the end, however, these descriptive models have struggled to deliver a 
coherent explanation for a central feature of the administrative state: the 
ubiquity of agency discretion.9 As legal realists have shown, the transmission-
belt and expertise models underestimate agencies' proactive role in the progres-
sive development of regulatory policy. The interest-representation model 
offers a more sophisticated strategy for taming agency discretion, but it, too, 
has limited traction as a descriptive theory of administrative law because 
agencies are not obligated to honor interest-group preferences in the rulemak-
ing process. Even advocates of the interest-representation model readily con-
cede that interest groups' "participation in such proceedings may have little 
impact on agency policy determinations."10 Nor does the political-control 
model offer a persuasive descriptive account of agency discretion. In a variety 
of contexts, administrative law significantly restrains the president's control 
over administrators and thereby insulates agency decisions from the political 
process. Although Congress could theoretically redesign the administrative 
state to draw all agency operations more firmly under the president's direct 
command and control, this would require drastic reconstructive surgery to 
semi-autonomous "independent". agencies and adjudicatory tribunals. In short, 
none of the descriptive models advanced to date fully captures the role of 
agency discretion in the legal architecture of the administrative state. 
This Article seeks to reframe the problem of agency discretion in admin-
istrative law by exploring the thematic and doctrinal parallels between admin-
istrative law's regulation of agency discretion and the legal constraints on 
fiduciaries in priyate legal relations such as trust, agency, partnership, guardi-
anship, and corporation. Fiduciary metaphors have long played a prominent 
role in the rhetoric of administrative law jurisprudence, but the influence of 
this rhetorical tradition in the development of administrative law has eluded 
critical analysis. The basic insight of this Article is that administrative law's 
metaphorical fiduciary foundations can no longer be dismissed as mere rhetoric; 
rather, public law increasingly draws upon fiduciary law's three foundational 
elements as a conceptual framework for constraining agency discretion and 
mediating relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 
9. See jERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC jUSTICE 1 (1983) (noting administrative law's 
legitimacy crisis and describing the history of American administrative law as a "history of failed 
ideas"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in che Administrative 
State, 78 N .Y.U. L. REV. 461,469 (2003) (reviewing and critiquing these models) . 
10. Stewart, supra note 5, at 1775. 
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The emerging "fiduciary model" in administrative law posits that admin-
istrative agencies are endowed with authority to set regulatory policy when 
Congress and the president, acting jointly as proxy settlors for the sovereign 
people, entrust them with regulatory discretion over an area of public con-
cern. While agency discretion may enhance the efficiency and responsive-
ness of public governance, it also gives rise to "agency costs"-monitoring 
and bonding expenditures and losses arising from the divergence between the 
public interest and agency practice. To minimize the risk that agencies will 
abuse their discretion through opportunism or negligence, each political 
branch monitors agency activity and retains some residual control to correct 
agency mismanagement. Agencies also are bound by a duty of fidelity to 
their statutory mandates, and duties of care and loyalty to their statutory 
beneficiaries. I argue that the fiduciary model of entrustment, residual control, 
and fiduciary duty offers a lucid lens for examining the role of agency 
discretion in contemporary administrative law because it deftly interweaves 
the law's disparate thematic strands--delegation, discretion, fidelity, ration-
ality, impartiality, and accountability-into a coherent and intelligible whole. 11 
While entrustment and residual control are familiar leitmotifs in admin-
istrative law jurisprudence, the same cannot be said for agency fiduciary 
duties. Certainly, courts do not routinely describe agency obligations in the 
lofty rhetoric of fiduciary duty; rather, agencies' legal duties to act prudently, 
impartially, and without undue self-interest have emerged incrementally over 
time as "due process" or "arbitrary and capricious" restraints on agency discre-
tion. In practice, however, these constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
standards radiate a similar aura of moral authority and serve similar func-
tions-namely, to deter breaches of the public trust and spur agencies to 
internalize vital social norms such as impartiality, rationality, and, most 
importantly, fidelity. The fiduciary model shows that administrative agencies' 
emerging fiduciary duties complement the political branches' residual 
controls and reinforce the social norms that shape agency behavior. 
As an interpretivist theory, the fiduciary model makes a valuable contri-
bution to contemporary criticism in administrative law by clarifying 
11. A few scholars have used simple principal-agent models to explore the "agency costs" 
incurred when the U.S. Congress and the president delegate authority to agencies. See, e.g., D. 
RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 24-25 
(1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of 
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the 
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy , 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994). In contrast to the fiduciary model 
advanced here, these principal-agent models posit either Congress or the president as the 
relation's sole "principal" and focus on the political branches' tools of residual control without 
considering the other legal and social norms that shape agency action. 
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the principles and policies that underpin enigmatic legal doctrines. For 
example, the fiduciary model suggests that the contemporary nondelegation 
doctrine, which theoretically limits Congress's authority to delegate lawmaking 
authority, might be best understood as a minimalist rule of prudent admini-
stration akin to the "prudent-investor" rule in trust law. Likewise, the contro-
versial theory of legislative delegation, which grounds judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, comes into sharper relief when 
viewed against the backdrop of agencies' residual political controls and fiduci-
ary duties. The fiduciary concept also helps explain the AP A's standards for 
judicial review of agency informal rulemaking, adjudication, and choice of 
policymaking procedures. In each of these contexts, the fiduciary model envi-
sions administrative agencies as stewards exercising discretion on behalf of 
their statutory beneficiaries, subject to the traditional fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and transparency. 
The balance of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general 
overview of contemporary fiduciary law, elaborating fiduciary relations' 
characteristic elements of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty. 
Part II applies this model to the administrative state, demonstrating that 
fiduciary law and administrative law bear strikingly similar features and 
perform analogous functions. Part III disaggregates the fiduciary model, exploring 
ways in which the binary principal-agent paradigm of administrative entrust-
ment, which has long dominated legal and political theory, fails to capture 
administrative law's flexible approach to agencies' structural and functional 
diversity. Specifically, I argue that other paradigmatic fiduciary relations such 
as trust, guardianship, and corporation may serve as useful alternative para-
digms for independent agencies, government corporations, and other admin-
istrative institutions. 
By illuminating administrative law's internal dynamics and implicit ambi-
tions, the fiduciary model also promises a practical payoff: It reveals areas where 
the law could be refined to enhance agency fidelity. As an illustration, Part IV 
explores two normative implications of the fiduciary model that enjoy broad 
acceptance in private law but have yet to take hold in administrative law. First, I 
argue that courts should expand Article III "injury-in-fact" standing where 
agency action prevents the agency's statutory beneficiaries from protecting their 
rights through the democratic process, provided that beneficiaries establish their 
adequacy as class representatives. Second, courts should enforce agencies' due 
process duties of care and loyalty more vigorously in settings where the agency 
costs of administrative governance are likely to be highest (for example, where 
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the president lacks effective control over agency policymaking). These meas-
ures would reinforce the fiduciary norms implicit in agency entrustment. 
Before setting out along this path, let me first clarify one point to avoid 
confusion: Although the fiduciary model advanced in this Article boasts sig-
nificant advantages over previous positive models of the administrative state, I 
harbor no illusions that the model might serve as a silver bullet for adminis-
trative law's legitimacy crisis. Since agency "legitimacy" is a contested concept 
resting on other contested concepts such as "democratic accountability" and 
"the mle of law," agency legitimacy is, and always wilt be, an ongoing 
national debate. 11 Moreover, care must be exercised to ensure that compari-
sons between administrative law and fiduciary law, "starting as devices to 
liberate thought," do not "end . . . by enslaving it."13 Keeping these limits in 
mind, however, the fiduciary model remains highly useful as a "device" for 
disclosing the values implicit in current administrative law doctrines, refo-
cusing debates over agency legitimacy, and thereby fostering interpretive 
communities. The fiduciary model reveals, for example, that administrative 
law incorporates multiple conceptions of agency fidelity, from pluralist majori-
tarianism to communitarian commitment reinforcement. The fiduciary model 
also suggests that some doctrines that have become flashpoints in 
administrative law's perceived legitimacy crisis (for example, the nondelega-
tion doctrine and agency independence) may be less problematic than they 
initially appear--or, more accurately, problematic in ways that are different 
from what critics generally assume. The fiduciary model thus serves as an invi-
tation to discussion rather than a suppressant to current debates over the 
legal, political, and social legitimacy of the administrative state. 
l. THE ARCHITECfURE OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
In a sense, the fiduciary concept is the oldest and most familiar model of 
the administrative state. The rhetoric of fiduciary obligation permeates western 
12. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the C onstitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 
(2005) (outlining three conceptions of constitutional legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral); 
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CAROOZO L. REV. 795 (1999) (reviewing several 
competing conceptions of"democracy" in administrative law) . 
13. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. O:l., ISS N.E. 58,61 (N .Y. 1926). In a previous article, I critiqued 
the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance upon contract metaphor in treaty interpretation. See Evan Criddle, 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 
450-55 (2004). 
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political theory, from Cicero's discourses On Moral Obligation, 14 to Locke's 
Two Treatises of Govemment, 15 to the seminal Federalist Papers .16 American 
legal rhetoric has internalized the metaphor of government officials and insti-
tutions as "agents and trustees"17 of popular sovereignty to such an extent that 
the terms "administrator" and "administrative agency" rarely arouse sustained 
critical reflection. Yet the fiduciary concept's pervasive influence in American 
political theory and legal rhetoric should not obscure the concept's role in 
defining the "deep structure" of administrative law. As a starting point in exca-
vating the fiduciary foundations of administrative law, this part briefly reviews 
the fiduciary concept's history, foundational elements, and interplay with 
social norms. 
Legal historians trace the fiduciary concept's genesis to the Roman fidu-
cia or fidei-commissia, 18 or, in Anglo-American law, to the rise of trusts in the 
Middle Ages. 19 Over time, the trust developed into a favored legal device for 
14. See, e.g., OCERO, ON MORAL OBLIGATION bk. I, ch. 25, § 85, at 69 (John Higginbotham 
trans., Faber & Faber 1976) ("The guardianship of the state is a kind of trusteeship which should always 
be managed to the advantage of the person entrusted rather than of those to whom he is entrusted."). 
15. See, e.g., jOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 77-79, 107--09, 
119-22, 136, 229-30 (Legal Classics Library 1994) (1698); see also E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. 
Young, Public Office as a Public Trusr: A Suggestion rluu Impeachment far High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1975) ("To formulate a new 
theory of constitutional government calling for restrained public authority, Locke ... rel ied upon 
the concept of a trust to limit governmental power to the exercise of those specific functions 
delegated to the Government .... [T)he Government's power should be encumbered with a trust 
to act on behalf of the beneficiaries-all those who had created government by the social 
contract."); id. at 1049 ("Lord Hardwicke held in 1742, the fiduciary obligations of officers are 
uniform regardless of whether they exercise their powers in a public or a private capacity.") 
(referring to Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 A.T.K. 400,406 (1742)); J.C. Shepherd, Note, Towards a 
Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 76 (1981) ("In the area of public 
officials, for example, as early as John Locke it was conceived that the fiduciary duty of 
representatives was the result of a conditional delegation of power.") (citation omitted) . 
16. See , e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ("The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the 
people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.") ; THE FEDERALIST 
No. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The delicacy and magnitude 
of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in 
the administration of public affairs speak for themselves."). 
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
18. See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955) (explaining that the Latin "fiduciarius" 
denotes "a trustee or one in a position of trust and as used in our law denotes anyone who holds 
the character of a trustee, or character analogous thereto"). 
19. See Jerry W . Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 199, 207--08 (1992). Even before the trust, the fiduciary concept resurfaced with 
the "use" in twelfth- and thirteenth-century England. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM 
FRANKLIN FRA TCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§§ 1.3-1 .8, at 12-28 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 
4thed. 1987). 
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conveyances of property because it empowered persons to "split the atom" of 
personal property rights between legal and equitable title. Trustees could 
obtain legal title to trust assets and responsibility for the assets' day-to-day 
administration, while beneficiaries-the cestui que trust-could acquire equi-
table title, including the right to enjoy the fruit of the trustee's labors. In its 
early history, however, the trust covered a much broader field of confidential 
relations. Courts of equity employed the trust concept whenever a party 
undertook "to exercise a power, to conduct a sale, to supervise an estate or 
business, or in some other way to become [another's] employee or agent."20 
As stewards for trust beneficiaries, trustees were expected to manage assets or 
perform other services in a conscientious manner, manifesting unqualified 
fidelity to their beneficiaries' interests. 21 
Over the centuries, Anglo-American courts gradually extended the 
fiduciary concept from trusts to a host of other private relations, including 
agency, partnerships, guardianships, conservatorships, receiverships, bailments, 
corporations, joint ventures, equitable charges, security arrangements, venture 
capital, strategic alliances, franchising, and certain counseling relations such 
as the attorney-client relationship.22 More recently, the rhetoric of fiduciary 
obligation also seems to be taking root in the legal obligations of parents, edu-
cators, physicians, psychiatrists, clergymen, and a variety of other confidential 
associations.21 Although this burgeoning field of "fiduciary law" remains very 
much a work in progress, there are strong indications "that our society is 
evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations."24 
The fiduciary concept, like many other dynamic common law concepts, 
is not easily reduced to rote definition.25 Its slipperiness arises, in part, from its 
common law genealogy. Courts have eschewed formalistic criteria for iden-
tifying fiduciary relations and instead reason by analogy to paradigmatic 
relations such as trust, partnership, and agency. This case-by-case, analogical 
20. L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69. 
21. See Charles E. Rounds, Fiduciary Liability of Trustees and Personal Representatives, 
853 TAX MGMT. A-3 (2003) ("[E]quity accepts the common law ownership of the trustee, but 
regards it as against conscience for him to exercise that legal ownership otherwise than for the 
benefit of the cestui que trust, and therefore engrafts the equitable obligation upon him.") 
(quoting G.W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 95 (6th ed. 1965)). 
22. See Markham, supra note 19, at 214 (chronicling this expansion). 
23. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding 
and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159 (2005); Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). 
24. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 ( 1983 ). 
25. See 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 2.3, at 40 (noting that legal concepts would 
lack practical value if they could be easily reduced to exact definitions). 
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approach has led some scholars to characterize fiduciary law-like 
administrative law-as an "atomistic" field resistant to unified theory. 26 
While the fiduciary concept resists essentialization, three elements are 
generally considered to be foundational for all fiduciary relations: entrustment, 
residual control, and fiduciary duties. 
A. Fiduciary Entrustment 
The starting point for all fiduciary relations is substitution: Fiduciaries stand 
in as stewards with discretion over an aspect of their beneficiaries' welfare. 27 Most 
fiduciaries-including agents, partners, and trustees-acquire their authority 
through a consensual delegation from dependants. O:msent and reliance are not 
prerequisites for fiduciary relations, however. In some circumstances, the 
common law treats persons in confidential relations as fiduciaries even if they 
were not authorized through an actual delegation from one holding authority. 
Guardianships are one obvious example: Minors and incompetents do not 
ordinarily delegate authority to their guardians to act on their behalf, but 
fiduciary law nonetheless imputes an entrustment of fiduciary authority to 
guardians and relies upon these fiduciaries to act in the best interests of their 
wards.28 Even in the absence of express or implied consent, courts superimpose 
the fiduciary concept "wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the 
relationship be that of blood, business, friendship, or association," rendering 
the beneficiary vulnerable to abuse of trust.29 Thus, the hallmark of fiduciary 
relations is not delegation per se, but rather the law's ex post identification of a 
confidential relation as one founded on trust. 
One reason why trust lies at the heart of all fiduciary relations is that 
fiduciaries cannot exercise complete control or ensure comprehensive moni-
toring of fiduciaries' actions without negating the fiduciary relation's efficien-
cies. Monitoring costs may be high due to fiduciary specialization and the 
difficulty of reducing fiduciary responsibilities to objective performance meas-
ures. Entrustors necessarily rely upon fiduciaries to perform their duties 
honorably, rendering the desired services in good faith without exploiting 
26. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 53 (reviewing various theories of fiduciary relations). 
2 7. See REsT A TFMENr (THIRD) OF TRusrs § 2 cmt. b (2003) ("[O]ne characteristic ... common 
to all [fiduciary relations is that] a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act 
for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship."). 
28. See generally Scott & Scott, supra note 23. 
29. Dawson v. Nat'! Life Ins. Co. of the U.S., 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916). 
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beneficiaries' vulnerability for personal gain. 10 Thus, fiduciary entrustment 
is predicated upon the expectation of fiduciary fidelity . 
The scope of fiduciary discretion varies significantly. In many employ-
ment relationships, for example, employees exercise discretion only when 
employers are unable to capture all significant terms of their employment 
contract with sufficient specificity.11 Shareholder-director relations fall closer 
to the opposite end of the spectrum. In public corporations, directors often 
enjoy sweeping discretion to set corporate policy and to appoint or remove 
corporate officers. This discretion does not arise solely from shareholders' 
inability to reduce their responsibilities to fixed contractual terms; rather, 
shareholders deliberately delegate policymaking duties to directors in order to 
mediate conflicts with corporate officers and take advantage of directors' 
experience and expertise. Whereas many employers view employee discre-
tion as a necessary evil, corporations--even in the skittish post-Enron 
environment--embrace director discretion as a tool for maximizing share-
holder profits. In short, the scope of fiduciary discretion reflects a variety of 
contextual factors, including the purpose of the entrustment and the per-
ceived trustworthiness of the particular fiduciary. 
By law, a fiduciary's authority extends no further than necessary for the 
performance of its entrusted function. 12 A tmstee's managerial responsibili-
ties , for example, are limited to the discrete assets identified in the terms of 
trust. Similarly, the "trust relation between the shareholders and the direc-
tors of a corporation ... usually extends ... only to the management of the 
general affairs of the corporation, with a view to dividends of profits."31 
Courts enforce these limits on fiduciary discretion to prevent unnecessary 
encroachments on beneficiaries' autonomy. 
30. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 392 ( 1980) ("Such reliance plausibly is h<~sed on the simple belief 
that the party with discretion in performance will keep the contract, and therefore will not use its 
discretion to rec<lpture forgone opportunities."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty 
in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684 (1990) ("The dependent 's reliance upon the 
power holder or, not quite conversely, the power holder's service as a surrogate for the dependent, 
characterizes the fiduciary relationship."). 
31. See Charles]. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Conrracrs, 67 VA. L. REV. I 089, 
1091 (1981) ("[Djefinitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain 
future conditions or because of in<~bility to characterize complex adaptations adequate ly even 
when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance."). 
32 . Frankel, supra note 24, at 809 n.48; see aLso Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 
2 5 U. TORONTO L.J. I, I 0 ( 1975) ("The extent of the fiduciary's discretion is demarcated, and the 
fiduci ary <'bligat.ion is imposed in order to compel a proper exercise of that discretion within the 
scope of the authority thus deline<~ted."). 
33. Dawson, 157 N.W. at 932 (quoting Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 581 (N .Y. 1868)). 
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B. Fiduciary Accountability: Residual Control and Fiduciary Duties 
The fiduciary concept presumes that fiduciaries will manifest altruism 
(or, at very least, honesty) in the exercise of their entrusted authority.34 Fiduci-
ary relations stand or fall on "the fiduciary's commitment to abandon self-
interest and promote her beneficiary's welfare instead of her own."35 The dark 
side of fiduciary discretion, of course, is that it places beneficiaries in a posi-
tion of acute vulnerability. Allowing fiduciaries to substitute for beneficiaries 
poses the risk that fiduciaries may behave opportunistically, misappropriating 
valuable resources or opportunities. They may devote insufficient energy to a 
delegated task or behave negligently or recklessly, dissipating entrusted 
resources, squandering opportunities, or injuring third parties. Furthermore, 
as recent corporate scandals illustrate all too vividly, fiduciaries often have 
both the opportunities and incentives to conceal their malfeasance from 
beneficiaries to avoid legal sanctions and public censure. Beneficiaries who are 
able to monitor fiduciary conduct may lack the expertise or experience to 
evaluate a fiduciary's performance effectively. The dangers posed by fiduciary 
entrustment are thus at least as great as the potential benefits.36 
If fiduciary entrustment relies upon a naively sanguine view of human 
nature, other aspects of fiduciary law view this relation with a jaundiced 
eye. To compensate for the potential divergence of interests between fiduci-
aries and beneficiaries, fiduciary law seeks to deter fiduciary malfeasance 
through a combination of hard and soft accountability mechanisms: residual 
control, judicial review, and socialization. First, fiduciary law holds fiduciaries 
accountable for failing to meet their commitments by honoring the entrustors' 
34. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of 
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 438-39 (2001); Frankel, supra note 24, at 832 ("By 
characterizing the fiduciary as an altruistic person, the courts emphasize and highlight the 
substitution aspect of the fiduciary relation, reassuring the entrustor that the fiduciary will act in 
the entrustor's interest."); Mitchell, supra note 30, at 1687 ("(T]he law assumes a high degree of 
altruism on the part of the fiduciary."). 
35. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1783 (2001). 
36. See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 
160 (1999) ("Th[e] need for dynamic management precludes the possibility of dictating the 
behavior of the fiduciary by specific and easily enforceable rules."); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial 
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) 
(discussing the threat of fiduciary opportunism); Goetz & Scott, supra note 31, at 1129 ("The 
fiduciary is in control of the level of efforts expended on the client's behalf; a conflict of interests 
over the proper level of efforts ... predictably will arise."); Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2420 
("(B]eneficiaries-whether shareholders, trust beneficiaries or legatees-are presumed to lack the 
requisite information or expertise to understand and evaluate the fiduciary's performance, and 
acquiring such information is very costly."). 
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residual equitable rights to intervene under certain limited circumstances. 
Second, the common law imposes certain basic duties on fiduciaries, which, if 
violated, give rise to a presumption of malfeasance and empower courts to nul-
lify fiduciary judgments. Third, legal rules reinforce preexisting social norms so 
as to encourage voluntary norm-internalization. Each of these bonding mecha-
nisms deters opportunism and waste, encourages beneficial socialization, and 
equips beneficiaries to discern ravenous wolves masquerading in sheep's clothing. 
1. Residual Control 
Residual-control rights are one mechanism for promoting fidelity. Even 
after entrustors delegate authority to fiduciaries, they reserve the right to 
supervise fiduciary performance and, in appropriate circumstances, to take 
corrective action to remedy fiduciary malfeasance-for example, by revoking 
fiduciaries' discretionary judgments or withdrawing entrusted authority. 
Some legal scholars have viewed these residual-control rights as "the defining 
attribute of fiduciary relationships."11 
Residual-control rights are not all created equal, however. In agency 
relations, most principals may intervene at will to correct agency misman-
agement and may dismiss agents without advance notice or legal fanfare . 18 Not 
so for trustees. To remove a prodigal trustee, beneficiaries must seek judicial 
intervention and show that the proposed removal is authorized by the trust 
terms or justified by "cause."19 Judicial standards for interfering with a trus-
tee's exercise of "discretionary power" are similarly stringent; courts will not 
disturb a trust except "to prevent misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion 
b h !140 y t e trustee. 
Strong policy considerations counsel beneficiaries against contracting 
for agency-style control in relations where fiduciaries exercise trustee-style 
discretion. Fiduciary discretion tends to be greatest in relations where benefi-
ciaries rely on fiduciaries to employ specialized skills or utilize context-specific 
knowledge. In corporations, enhanced discretion may also reflect fiduciaries' 
crucial role as mediator between competing classes of beneficiaries or 
between the beneficiaries as a whole and other stakeholders such as corporate 
37. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Crirical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Dury, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399, 
1405 (2002). 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 406 ( 1958). 
39. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003); LEWIS M. SIMES, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON THELAW OFFIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION91 (1941) . 
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50. 
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management.41 Under such circumstances, beneficiaries intentionally abdicate 
a greater measure of control to fiduciaries, recognizing that even the most 
well-intentioned interference with fiduciary performance may inadvertently 
stymie productivity. 
On the other hand, courts do not ordinarily enforce agreements that 
preclude beneficiaries from exerting any residual control over fiduciaries. The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that "[i]t is contrary to sound policy, and 
a contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a 'trustee' of all 
accountability .... Even under the broadest grant of fiduciary discretion, a 
trustee must act honestly and in a state of mind contemplated by the settlor."42 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
Fiduciary duties offer a complementary mechanism for promoting fiduci-
ary accountability. As an ethical and legal imperative, fiduciaries are to act 
"primarily for the benefit of [their beneficiaries] in matters connected with 
[the] undertaking," performing their designated roles with due diligence and 
unqualified fidelity. 43 In traditional legal parlance, these responsibilities are 
grouped under two general headings: the "duty of loyalty" and the "duty of 
care.'.+4 Since these two general duties apply to diverse types of fiduciary rela-
tions, their precise application is necessarily context dependent. Courts 
enforce the duties of loyalty and care to encourage prudent exercise of 
entrusted authority and to prevent fiduciaries from reaping personal benefit 
from self-interested transactions unless the beneficiaries expressly authorize 
the breach.45 Although fiduciary duties may, in some instances, be modified or 
abrogated by contract, courts tend to treat these duties as nonnegotiable.46 
Fiduciary duties complement beneficiaries' residual-control rights, granting 
fiduciaries broad latitude to set discretionary policies but ensuring that these 
policies do not transgress reasonable limits. 
41. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,271 (1999). 
42 . RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 50 cmt. c. 
43. Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326,327-28 (Md. 1946) (quoting REsTATEMENT OF AGENCY§ 13 
cmt. a (1933)); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N .E. 545,548 (N.Y. 1928) (describing this "rule 
of undivided loyalty" as "relentless and supreme"). 
44. Some courts have hinted that there might be an analytically distinct "duty of good 
faith," but the attributes of this nascent duty are not entirely clear. E.g., In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 15452,2005 WL 2056651 , at *35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) . 
45 . See Blair & Stout, supra note 35, at 1782~3 . 
46. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust 
Law at Century's End, 88 CALL. REv. 1877, 1911 (2000). 
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 131 2006-2007
Fiduciary Foundations 131 
a. The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of undivided loyalty obligates fiduciaries to act "solely in the 
interest of the beneficiary" without giving consideration to personal advan-
tage.47 Fiduciaries may not conclude transactions that engender conflicts of 
interests with their beneficiaries. Judicial decisions give this duty a prophylactic 
edge: Fiduciaries are prohibited from consummating self-interested transactions 
without beneficiaries' informed authorization even if the transactions were for 
fair market value and did not adversely affect the beneficiaries' interests.48 If a 
fiduciary enters into a self-interested transaction without making full disclosure 
to the beneficiary and obtaining the beneficiary's approval, or if the transaction 
is otherwise unfair to the beneficiary, the beneficiary may ask a court in 
equity to void the transaction, impose a constructive trust, and compel the 
fiduciary to disgorge any profits obtained from the transaction.49 Courts may 
also enjoin fiduciaries from using beneficiaries' property or privileges for an 
unau thorized, self-serving purpose. 
Where a fiduciary relation involves multiple beneficiaries, the duty of 
loyalty takes on an antidiscrimination aspect: Unless otherwise provided for 
by contract, fiduciaries are bound to render an equal measure of fidelity to each 
beneficiary. An exercise of discretion that facially augments one beneficiary's 
interests at another's expense is as much a breach of fiduciary duty as a self-
interested transaction. 
b. The Duty of Care 
In addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries bear a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in performing their services for beneficiaries. Courts generally char-
acterize this duty as an iteration of the prudent-steward standard; fiduciaries 
rf h . k . " d f . h "50 "b a: " 51 . " h must pe orm t etr tas s m goo att , use est euorts, or exeretse sue 
47. John H. Langbein, The Conrracrarian Basis of the Law of Trusts , 105 YALE L.J. 625, 655 
(1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) ); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (describing fiduciaries' obligation to beneficiaries primarily 
as a duty "to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency"). 
48. See Langbein, supra note 4 7, at 655-56. 
49. See 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra n ote 19, § 2.5, at 43; see also Snepp v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (holding that constructive trust and disgorgement are 
appropria te remed ies for a fiduciary's breach of trust) . 
50. Roberr Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary RelacionshifJ: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049 & n.8 (1991). 
51. /d .; see, e.g., Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods lnt'l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 172 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (reg<~rding implied duty to use best efforts); Wood v. Lucy, L<~dy Duff-Gordon, 
11 8 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917) (regarding implied reasonable effom in contractual reli!tionships). 
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care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with 
his own property."52 In practice, however, courts do not ordinarily hold 
fiduciaries personally liable for actions within the scope of their discretion (as 
opposed to actions outside their vested authority) absent a showing that the 
actions were grossly negligent or reckless, rather than merely unreasonable or 
imprudent.53 Thus, the duty of care requires fiduciaries to take and preserve a 
beneficiary's property, to defend legal actions against the fiduciary relation, to 
pay income due to the beneficiaries, and to inform themselves of all material 
information reasonably available prior to making an important decision. 
Unlike the duty of loyalty, the duty of care is not prophylactic; beneficiaries 
must demonstrate that they have suffered cognizable injury from the fiduci-
ary's failure to meet the requisite standard of care.54 
c. Recordkeeping and Accounting Duties 
From the general duties of loyalty and care, courts have extrapolated a 
series of subsidiary duties that share elements of both duties and operate as 
prophylactic rules. These include the duty "to keep clear and accurate 
accounts,"55 the duty to give beneficiaries a complete and accurate account-
ing of their performance when requested,56 and the duty to keep beneficiaries' 
property separate from the fiduciary's personal property.57 Each of these duties 
decreases beneficiaries' monitoring costs and enhances their ability to detect 
and deter breaches of trust. Fiduciaries must satisfy these duties whether or 
not the beneficiaries can demonstrate actual injury.58 
C. Fiduciary Socialization 
Although fiduciaries are accountable for flagrant abuses of trust, courts 
generally tum a blind eye to garden-variety indiscretions. Fiduciary law is not 
necessarily indifferent to less egregious forms of fiduciary misbehavior, but it 
recognizes that formal accountability mechanisms can also have deleterious 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174; see also 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 
19, § 2.5, at 43 (discussing this standard) . 
53. See Rounds, supra note 21, at A-4 ("The current state of the default law is to limit the 
trustee's o r personal representative's personal exposure in tort to situations where the trustee is 
personally at fault. "). 
54. See Langbein, supra note 47 , at 656. 
55. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 172, at 452 . 
56. Id. § 172, at 454-56. 
57 . See SIMES, supra note 39, at 215 . 
58. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004 ). 
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effects. Overenforcing fiduciary duties can diminish fiduciary relations' effec-
tiveness by stifling expert innovation or deterring reasonable risk taking. 
Fiduciaries may be more likely to shirk their obligations if they perceive that 
shirking has become the status quo. Beneficiaries may lose faith in their fidu-
ciaries and commit more resources to monitoring, defeating the fiduciary rela-
tion's erstwhile efficiencies. Thus, fiduciary relations' utility and viability 
ultimately tum upon the perception of fiduciary fidelity. 19 
To preserve the fragile environmental conditions where trust can survive 
and thrive, fiduciary law works "in concert with extralegal influences," 
reinforcing, rather than displacing, pre-existing rules of moral conduct.60 For 
this reason, it is not uncommon for judicial opinions to adopt a sennonizing 
tone when discussing fiduciary duties, as in then-Judge Cardozo's classic 
statement that fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a duty of "finest loyalty .. . 
stricter than the morals of the market place" or the "punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive.',;' Fiduciaries must manifest "undivided and unselfish loyalty" 
and "utmost good faith," and they must conform their actions to "the highest 
standards of honor and honesty."62 Such uncompromising moralistic rhetoric 
may seem excessive as a description of fiduciaries' legal obligations,61 but it 
has great practical value, reinforcing the extralegal aspirational norms that 
shape fiduciary behavior. In the words of Edward Rock, fiduciary law "evolves 
59. See Blair & Stout, supra note 35 , at 1798 (describing the business-judgment rule "as a 
'second best' solution to the problem of opportunism in corporate relationships-a solution that 
recognizes that corporate law influences behavior not just by imposing sanctions but also by shaping 
perceptions of what sort of behavior is expected, appropriate, and common"). 
60. Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2476. 
61. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928). 
62. Davis, supra note 36, at 1-2 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) 
(describing the duty of loyalty as a "rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily 
and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty"); Grossberg v. H<Jffenberg, 11 N.E.Zd 359, 
360 (Ill. 1937)) . 
63. Contmctarians who view fiduciary duties as mer<;: default t<;:rms have derided tht!n -
judge Cardozo's formulation, <~rguing that "the underlying deal" may not "support[ I th [is] level of 
fiduciary obligation." Langbein, supra note 4 7, at 658; see, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Opting Ouc of Fiduciary Duties: A Response w che Anri-Contraccarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71-72 
(1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Oucy, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425, 
426-27 (1993 ). Anti-contractarians argue that fiduciary duties cannot plausibly he characterized 
as mere default contract rules because courts routinely enforce these duties as mandatory standards 
irrespective of the contracting parties' agreements. See , e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403-10 ( 1985 ); 
Roberr C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55, 60-61 
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eels., 1985); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An 
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of 
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 146l (1989). 
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primarily at the level of norms rather than the level of rules'!64 and influences 
fiduciary performance "not primarily by threatening liability but by expressing 
and reinforcing social norms of careful and loyal behavior."65 
Fiduciary law thus serves an important expressive function, conveying 
society's aspirations for fiduciary diligence and loyalty. Courts encourage fidu-
ciaries to view their role as a call to service, drawing motivation from a spirit 
of duty and honor as much as from a fear of coercion or sanctions. These "soft" 
norms accomplish something that "hard" fiduciary law cannot: They decrease 
the need for judicial intervention by enhancing the reputational rewards of 
fiduciary fidelity. As Elizabeth and Robert Scott have observed, fiduciary 
entrustment "invokes respect in the community, signaling that the individual 
has assumed an important responsibility, and is trustworthy and morally 
upright. Community recognition of these attributes carries its own reward, 
enhancing the nonpecuniary value of the fiduciary role.'t66 Fiduciary relations 
function most effectively, therefore, when legal constraints operate in concert 
with social norms to promote fidelity. 
D. Balancing Fiduciary Discretion 
In this rough sketch of fiduciary law, the architecture of fiduciary rela-
tions emerges as a delicate dialectic of trust and distrust, discretion and 
accountability, hard legal rules and soft social norms. Fiduciary law honors 
entrustment, allowing fiduciaries to exercise discretion within the scope of 
their prescribed authority. But the law also reinforces the heightened expec-
tations for fiduciary behavior by calibrating beneficiaries' residual control and 
fiduciary duties to reduce the threat of opportunism and waste. Placing too 
much emphasis on any one element of fiduciary relations-say, beneficiary 
control or fiduciary duty-could prove counterproductive if it interferes with 
fiduciary expertise or gives rise to a perception of fiduciary untrustworthiness. 
The architecture of fiduciary law depends, therefore, upon courts cautiously 
calibrating and recalibrating fiduciary duties and beneficiaries' control to pre-
serve the balance between competing pressures, incentives, and values. 
64. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1097 (1997). 
65 . Blair & Scout, supra note 35, at 1794 ("[D)irectorial care is largely driven by social 
norms, rather than by the threat of liability . ... ")(citing Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and 
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1265 (1999)); Rock, supra note 64, at 1016 ("Delaware 
courts generate in the first instance the legal standards . .. which influence the development of 
the social norms of directors [and) officers .... "). 
66. Scott & Score, supra note 23, at 2429. 
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In the end, fiduciary law's perceived legitimacy depends upon its effi-
cacy: Does the law's mix of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duties 
promote fiduciary care and loyalty in a particular context? Opinions will differ, 
of course, on where the law should strike this balance. Some policymakers 
might prefer to increase fiduciary discretion and risk malfeasance so as to 
maximize the fiduciary relation's potential efficiencies. Others might choose to 
strengthen beneficiaries' residual control or fiduciary duties at the expense of 
fiduciary efficiency and expertise. Because different fiduciary relations involve 
different types of discretion, the balance between entrustment, residual control, 
and fiduciary duties necessarily varies from one fiduciary relation to another. 
Efforts to enhance the legitimacy of fiduciary relations thus necessitate 
engagement with the fiduciary concept's contextual and normative dimensions. 
II. TOWARD A FIDUCIARY MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Administrative law, like private fiduciary law, vests individuals and insti-
tutions with authority to perform services for beneficiaries. Delegation may 
enhance government's specialization and responsiveness, but it also generates 
opportunities for corruption, factionalism, arbitrariness, and waste-the 
enduring hazards of fiduciary representation.67 In light of these important 
commonalities between public and private law, courts often envision the 
administrative state, "in its own way, [a]s the people's ... fiduciary for certain 
purposes."68 This view of government officers and institutions as public fiduci-
aries is not "mere metaphor," according to some courts, but rather "a living 
f . ,,69 tenet o our sooety. 
67. See Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. PoL SCI. REV. I , I 
(2001) (coining the term "governance dilemma" to denote the difficulty that "[ajlthough institutions 
are essential for human life , they are also dangerous"). 
68. Metro. W ash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abate ment of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc ., 501 U.S. 252, 272 ( 1991) (quoting Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of 
Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 385 ( 1976)); see also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 ( 1900) 
(describing public offices as "mere agencies or trusts"); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 
( 1879) ("The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government .... The 
people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public 
health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights."); Black River ReguiMing 
Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 1954) (approving "the theory that the 
power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be exercised not for the benefit or 
at the will of the trustee but for the common good"). 
69. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776--1787, at 546 ( 1969) (discussing the role of public 
offic ials as "rulers and representatives ... at the same time"); Rogers & Young, supra note 15 , at 
1029-30 ("The English Whigs and the American framers embraced the private law concept of trust 
and extended its application even further in regulat ing public offices .... Just as citizens could give 
their property in trust, the sovereign could give his offices in trust ." ). 
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The fiduciary concept's pervasive influence in administrative law merits 
closer investigation. Traditionally, legal scholarship has viewed the law's 
recourse to metaphor with skepticism, if not outright hostility.10 Yet scholarly 
discomfort with "legal fictions" has not unsettled the private-law metaphors 
that are embedded so deeply in the conceptual foundations of administrative 
law. If anything, the venerable rhetoric of public institutions as "agencies" 
headed by "administrators" and "officers," all exercising "delegated" authority 
as a "public trust," has become more apt as a description of administrative law 
doctrine over the last half-century. Fiduciary law's core elements of entrust-
ment, residual control, and fiduciary duty increasingly capture the "deep 
structure" of administrative law-from the glacial evolution of constitutional 
precepts to the flowering of statutory standards for agency discretion. 
Throughout administrative law jurisprudence, the· fiduciary model "triggers 
powerful, recurring frameworks of meaning and patterns of belief ... [and] 
sets in motion deeply rooted folk images, archetypes, and story lines," thereby 
mediating the relationships between administrative agencies, the political 
and judicial branches, and the people as a whole.71 Analyzing administrative 
law from a fiduciary perspective thus illuminates the law's internal logic and 
ambitions, and offers glimpses into administrative law's future . 
A. Administrative Entrustment 
At its heart, administrative law governs the exercise of entrusted author-
ity by institutions that serve as stewards for the people. The terms of an 
administrative agency's enabling statute reflect the type and degree of trust 
that the people, through their elected representatives, have chosen to repose 
in the agency. Implicit in this public entrustment is the expectation that 
agencies, like private-law fiduciaries, will align their performance with the 
expressed and implicit interests of their beneficiaries, exercising their discre-
tion to promote the beneficiaries' welfare. In theory, this marriage of agency 
specialization, discretion, and fidelity should enhance the federal govern-
ment's efficiency and responsiveness. 
70. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 2 (1967) ("The fiction has generally been 
regarded as something of which the law ought to be ashamed, and yet with which the law cannot, 
as yet, dispense."); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 
186 (2004) ("Legal scholars have traditionally understood metaphor as, at worst, a perversion of 
the law, and at best, a necessary but temporary place-holder for more fully developed lines of argument. 
On this view, metaphors are vague and inherently manipulable, appealing to base instincts, whereas 
explicit legal argumentation represents the rigorous, authentic core of law."). 
71. Tsai, supra note 70, at 189. 
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Although virtually all agencies trace their authority to an express or 
implied delegation from Congress, the scope of agencies' authority varies 
dramatically. Some federal agencies have sweeping substantive missions and 
enjoy correspondingly broad powers. The Federal Trade Commission Act, for 
instance, authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to take steps to 
curb "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices," but provides strikingly little guidance regarding what competitive 
strategies would qualify as "unfair" or "deceptive."72 Such broadly phrased stan-
dards give agencies enormous flexibility to craft regulatory regimes responsive 
to legislative policies in complex or changing circumstances. 
To the extent that agencies are authorized to prescribe law through sub-
stantive rulemaking or adjudication, the agencies' determinations are 
accorded legislative effect, meaning that they are binding not only for the 
government but also for the public at large.13 Not all agencies have the power 
to act with the force of law, however. Some agencies exercise investigatory 
or reporting powers without the authority to promulgate legally binding 
regulations or adjudicative decisions. Such agencies may engage in crusades of 
public persuasion or may recommend that other agencies pursue a preferred 
course of action.14 Even where Congress does delegate regulatory authority to a 
particular agency, it may choose to cabin the agency's discretion by prescrib-
ing narrow principles for implementation such as the specific qualification 
criteria for government benefits.75 
However an administrative agency's responsibilities are defined, the 
fiduciary model emphasizes that agencies bear a solemn responsibility to 
honor the terms and spirit of their entrusted authority. Like private-law fidu-
ciaries, agencies are expected to manifest fidelity to the trust reposed in them. 
Courts have come to recognize over time that agencies must not only satisfy 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000). 
73. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U .S. 141 , 153 (1982) 
("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect [upon state law] than federal statutes."); 
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (holding that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services' interpret ive rules are "entitled to 'legislative effect' because, '[in] a situation of 
this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility 
for interpreting the statutory term."') (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,425 (1977)). 
74. See Thom<~s W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I : From Nondelegacion co Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2169 (2004) (citing the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) to resolve complaints by conciliation). 
75. WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 1.01 (4th ed. 2000); 
see also I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 6.3, <~t 234 (3d ed. 1994) ("[A]n agency has the power to issue binding legislative rules only if 
and to the extent Congress has <~uthorized it to do so."). 
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the strict terms of their statutory mandates (as prescribed in the transmission-
belt model) and investigate public preferences (as dictated by the interest-
representation model), but also assume responsibility as fiduciaries for the 
broader interests of their statutory beneficiaries. "While retaining the interest 
representation model's concern with protecting regulatory beneficiaries, courts 
have recognized that merely ensuring the participation of all affected interests 
will not ensure the protection of those for whom Congress has expressed special 
solicitude," Judge Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit has observed.76 Hence, 
the courts have turned instead to an expanded notion of fidelity, one 
that requires not only that the agencies not exceed their congression-
ally authorized powers, but also that they use those powers as Congress 
intended. In short, the courts have reached back to the oldest of 
administrative law values-maintaining agency constancy to congres-
sional purpose-in order to extend protection to a new class of legisla-
tive beneficiaries. 77 
Agencies' "fidelity to congressional intent" is the "central concern of 
administrative law"78 because legislative directives typically represent the 
conditions upon which agency policymaking is predicated. Where legislative 
directives leave gaps for agencies to fill or speak in terms so broad as to 
"give little hint of the congressional intent to which the agency must be 
faithful,"79 agencies look beyond Congress's specific intent to the broader 
public interest. This expanded emphasis on agency fidelity reflects the fiduci-
ary model's vision of administrative agencies as fiduciary institutions endowed 
with authority from the sovereign people to perform services for their 
statutory beneficiaries. 
Because the initial "entrustors" and ultimate "beneficiaries" of agency 
authority are frequently one and the same-the people as a whole-there is a 
natural tendency to conflate these categories. But this is a mistake. While all 
government authority might emanate in the first instance from the people, 
many agencies service a discrete subset of the U.S. population (for example, 
welfare recipients), aid persons outside U.S. territory (for example, recipients of 
international humanitarian assistance), or protect private interests that cut 
across national boundaries (as in, for example, international-trade regulation).80 
76. Garland, supra note 5, at 512. 
77. Id. (citation omitted). 
78. /d.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §50 cmt. c (2003) ("Even under the 
broadest grant of fiduciary discretion, a trustee must act honestly and in a state of mind 
contemplated by the settlor."). 
79. Garland, supra note 5, at 590. 
80. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law 22 (Inst. for lnt'l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2004/1, 2004 ), available 
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Agencies bear duties of fidelity not only to the terms of their statutory 
entrustment but also to the best interests of their statutory beneficiaries, 
however defined. Therefore, the tension in fiduciary law between a settlor's ex 
ante expectations and beneficiaries' ex post preferences also reverberates 
throughout administrative law. In both spheres, a central "theme is flexibility 
and efficiency in the pursuit of the best interests of ... beneficiaries within 
the settlor's legally permissible objectives."81 The fiduciary model thus clarifies 
administrative law's approach to agency entrustment in the following respects. 
1. Agency Entrustment: Institutional and Individual 
First, the fiduciary model offers a useful starting point for explaining why 
the Constitution divides the incorporation power for administrative agencies 
between the three branches rather than committing this power exclusively to 
a single branch. As fiduciaries for the people as a whole, administrative agencies' 
fiduciary obligations do not run solely to the chief executive or the legislature 
per se, but rather to the agencies' statutory beneficiaries, who are often, but 
not always, the sovereign people as a whole. To minimize the risk that either 
branch will unilaterally dominate public administration to beneficiaries' 
detriment, the Constitution divides the tasks of agency entrustment. Congress 
may entrust regulatory authority to administrative institutions, but only the 
executive or judiciary has the power to populate these institutions by vesting 
regulatory authority in individual administrators.82 
For its part, Congress designs administrative agencies and sets the terms 
of agency entrustment. Agencies trace their authority to enabling legislation, 
popularly referred to as its "enabling act" or "organic act." Like a corporation's 
articles of incorporation, the enabling act outlines an agency's basic structure 
and pinpoints the agency's coordinates within the firmament of federal 
at http://www.iilj.org/papers/2004/documents/2004.1 KingsburyKrischStewart.pdf (observing that 
"domestic regulatory bodies and officials" increasingly act as agents of global regularory regimes, 
with duties to "orher states ... individuals and firms subject to regulation, [and] broader soc ial and 
economic interests"). 
81. Halbach, supra note 46, at 1881. 
82. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircwfr Noise, Inc., 
501 U.S. 252, 269 ( 1991) (holding that Q)ngress may not delegate regulatory power to an institution 
in which "membership ... is restricted to congressional officials"). Not all agencies have been created 
by Congress. SeeM. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 
1387 n.4 (2004) (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency was estab lished first by 
executive action) (citing Richard Nixon, Special Message from the Presidenr w the Congress About 
Reorganization Plans w Eswblish the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (July 9, 1970), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: RICHARD NIXON , 1970, at 578 ( 1971 ), available at http://www.hti .umich.edu/p/ppotpus). 
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bureaucracy. For example, an enabling act may charge an agency with oversight 
of a particular industry or public resource, fix the agency's basic modus 
operandi, decide whether the agency will be led by a cabinet-level or subordinate 
officer, assign the agency to a particular station within the executive branch's 
organizational chart, and determine to what degree the agency's decisionmaking 
processes will be insulated from presidential control. Perhaps most importantly, 
Congress defines the overarching principles or objectives that should govern 
the agency's exercise of discretion. 
Although Congress sets the terms of entrustment for administrative 
agencies, "in the business of appointments" the executive branch serves as the 
people's "principal agent."83 The Appointments Clause of Article II empowers 
the president to select all "Officers of the United States" with the "Advice and 
Consent of the Senate."84 The Appointments Clause screens Congress from par-
ticipating directly in agency appointments, as the Supreme Court stressed in 
Buckley v. Valeo85 and Bowsher v. Synar.86 Congress may choose whether to 
assign the appointment power for "inferior Officers" to "the President alone," 
to "the Courts of Law," or to "the Heads of Oepartments.',s7 However, it "may 
not direct that its laws be implemented through persons who are its agents in 
the sense that it chose them."88 
The bifurcation of entrustment power between Congress and the presi-
dent operates not only as "a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power 
at the expense of another,"89 but also as a safeguard against either branch 
hijacking agency policymaking for personal gain. The Appointments Clause 
thus reflects the fiduciary model's vision of administrative agencies as stewards 
for the people as a whole rather than as mere institutional appendages of 
Congress or the president. 
2. Legislative Subdelegation 
A second area where the fiduciary model clarifies administrative law is the 
so-called "nondelegation doctrine," which theoretically prohibits Congress 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
85. 424 u.s. 1 (1976). 
86. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
87. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
88. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 766 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (describing the 
Coun's holding in Buckley). 
89. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (implying that the Appointments Clause was designed 
"to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others"). 
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from delegating "legislative power" to the executive and legislative branches. 
The nondelegation doctrine traces its ancestry to a venerable maxim of 
fiduciary law, delegata potestas non potest delegari (he who holds a delegated 
power lacks the power to delegate it). In Locke's words: 
The power of the Legislat[ure], being derived from the People by a 
positive voluntary Grant ... can be no other than what that positive 
grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make 
Legislators, the Legislat[ure] can have no power to transfer their 
Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands90 
While some have characterized the nondelegation doctrine as "essential 
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by 
the Constitution,"91 the doctrine's formalistic approach to "lawmaking power" 
has proven to be unworkable in practice. Congress has neither the time nor the 
specialized expertise to set every emissions standard, review every new 
consumer drug, or assess the merits of every proposed modification to the 
endangered species list. Even if Congress could perform these services, the 
glacial pace of legislative action would prevent it from responding effectively 
in an era of rapid economic, technological, and social change. As the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in Mistretta v . United States,91 "Congress simply cannot do 
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."91 
Bowing to these practical constraints, the Court has allowed Congress to 
subdelegate the details of federal regulation to agencies provided that 
Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide agency discretion.94 
The Court's anemic enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine has 
prompted some scholars to characterize the doctrine as a failed experiment, a 
historical aberration that has fallen into desuetude.91 Over sixty years have 
passed since the Court last struck down federal legislation on nondelegation 
90. LOCKE, supra note IS, bk. II , § 141 ; see also Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 390, 395 ( 1831) ("[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated authority cannot be delegated."). 
91. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,697 (1892) (Lamar, J. , dissenting). 
92. 488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
93. Jd. at 372; see also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 
(1928) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine's application should be consistent with 
"common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination"). 
94. Mistreun, 488 U.S. at 372-73. 
95. This question has been debated most recently by Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, Larry 
Alexander, and Saikrishna Prakash. Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegarion Docr:rine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) !hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Interring] 
(arguing that a statutory grant of authority ro the executive branch does not effect a delegation of legislative 
power), and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Venneule, Norulelegacion: A Post-murtem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 
(2003) (same), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Re{Xms of the Nondelegation Docr:rine 's Death 
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003) (challenging the Posner-Vermeule thesis). 
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grounds.96 In the meantime, it has approved numerous delegations with vacu-
ous "intelligible principle[s]" such as the instructions to set "fair and equitable" 
prices or to award broadcast licenses in "the public interest.'m While the Court 
has not formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine,98 the emergence of the 
intelligible-principle rule has left the doctrine with a menacing bark, but no 
real bite. 
This defanged nondelegation doctrine might seem, at first glance, to 
bear little resemblance to the delegata potestas maxim passed down from 
fiduciary law. But delegata potestas was never the monolithic rule that Locke 
envisioned. As Justice Story recognized in a private-law case, "the true doc-
trine" was far more nuanced and contextual: Delegated authority is "exclu-
sively personal, unless from the express language used, or from the fair 
presumptions, growing out of the particular transaction, or of the usage of 
trade, a broader power was intended to be conferred on the agent.''99 The 
presumption against fiduciary subdelegation could be rebutted by evidence 
of industry custom or of a different expectation between the parties. Over 
time, these exceptions have eclipsed the nondelegation presumption. 
Trustees today commonly enlist professional financial consultants for 
assistance with asset management.100 Stockholders expect corporate directors to 
subdelegate administrative duties within corporations to expert managers. As 
economic and social change have eroded the assumptions upon which the 
nondelegation canon once rested, courts have permitted greater fiduciary 
subdelegation to further beneficiaries' interests and honor entrustors' 
presumed intent. 101 Thus, private law and administrative law have both 
96. See ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating 
a delegation under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) to establish codes of fair 
competition); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (invalidating a delegation to 
the president under NIRA to prohibit interstate shipment of certain oil). 
97. Harold]. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 724-25 & nn.57-59 
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). 
98. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
99. Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 95, at 1733 (quoting jOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY§ 14, at 14-16 (Boston, Charles P. Greenough ed., Little, 
Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1882) (1839)). 
100. Indeed, some have suggested that current law might require amateur trustees to 
subdelegate investment authority to professionals. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory 
of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 640 n.91 (2004) (citing inter alia RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 & cmt. f (1992); John H. Langbein, The Uniform 
Prudent Inveswr Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641,665--66 (1996)). 
101. See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 171, at 438 ("[The duty not to delegate) 
does not mean, of course, that the trustee must personally perform every act that may be necessary 
or proper in the execution of the trust. He can properly permit others to perform acts he cannot 
reasonably be required personally to perform."). Congress also has given the president substantial 
discretion to subdelegate authoriry to "the head of any department or agency in the executive 
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drifted toward a more flexible nondelegation doctrine, one that reflects 
popular expectations about the propriety of fiduciary subdelegation. 
The "prudent-investor" rule in private law and the "intelligible-principle" 
rule in administrative law each operate as weak constraints on fiduciary 
subdelegation, permitting all but the most flagrant and exhaustive abdica-
tions of responsibility. For example, trustees bear a "duty not to delegate the 
doing of acts [that they] can reasonably be required personally to perform,"102 
but they also "ha[ve] power, and may sometimes have a duty, to delegate such 
functions and in such manner as a prudent investor would delegate under the 
. ni Ol U d h d . l d £ ' circumstances. n er t e pru ent-mvestor ru e, courts erer to a trustees 
detennination regarding the propriety of a subdelegation except under extreme 
circumstances, such as where the subdelegation effectively "transfer[s] to 
another the whole responsibility for the administration of the trust ."104 The 
co-evolution of these rules over the past century parallels shifting public 
expectations and reflects the conceptual linkages between private fiduciary 
law and administrative law. 
3. Delegation and Deference 
The standards for judicial deference to administrative agencies also 
closely parallel principles of private fiduciary entrustment. Federal courts 
have "long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight" to agency 
actions and routinely defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.101 
This tradition of judicial deference to agency discretion builds upon a theory 
of agency entrustment that has its roots in the fiduciary concept. 
branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate." 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(5) (2000) (empowering the 
president to authorize subordinates to delegate authority); 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) (authorizing 
the attorney general to subde legate authority). 
102. 2ASCOTT& FRATCHER, supranote 19,§ 171.2, at 442. 
I 03. Halbach, supra note 46, at 1910 (explaining that a tntstee need only "act with prudence in 
deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in the selection and supervision of agents") 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE§ 227(c)(2) ( 1992)). 
104. 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 171.1, at 439. The prudent-investor rule 
may also help to explain why the Court has permitted Congress to delegate certain regulatory 
activities to privflte parties. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 987 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting) ("While most authority to issue rules and regulations is given to the Executive Branch and 
the independent regulatory agencies, statutory delegRtions to private persons have Rlso passed this 
Court's scrutiny."); United States v. Rock Royal Coop. Inc. , 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 ( 1939) 
(upholding an f\Ct that gave private partie-; a veto rx)wer over agency m<~rketing orders); Currin v. 
Wallace, 306 U.S. l ( 1939) (upholding an act a llowi ng farmers affected by agency action to vote 
on prospective regulations). 
105. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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The natural starting point for exploring judicial deference to agency 
decisionmaking is Justice Stevens's classic two-step analysis in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.106 First, federal courts do 
not defer to agency decisions that contravene the "unambiguously expressed 
. f Co "107 s d h Co l " " . h mtent o ngress. econ , w ere ngress eaves a gap m t e statutory 
scheme "for the agency to fill," courts construe the gap as "an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation" and will defer to the agency's reasonable constructions 
of the statute. 108 To these two steps, recent Court decisions add a third piece to 
the puzzle, popularly known as Skidmore deference: Where administrative 
agencies seek to regulate an area beyond the scope of their statutorily 
delegated authority, their interpretation of a statute is not conclusive, but 
may be accorded considerable weight "depend[ing] upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control."109 Thus, administrative law currently 
posits at least three scenarios where judicial deference to agency administration 
may be appropriate: ( 1) the agency implements an unambiguous statutory 
instruction; (2) the agency exercises delegated rulemaking authority to resolve 
an ambiguity or fill a gap in a statutory regime; or (3) the agency's interpretation 
of the statute is otherwise persuasive. 
Although the expertise, interest-representation, and presidential-control 
models offer supporting policy rationales for Chevron deference,110 the Court 
106. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
107. /d. at 843 (citations omitted). 
108. /d. at 843-44. This is true even if a court has previously spoken to the question resolved 
by the agency. See Nat'! Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 
2700 (2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the 
agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting 
agency construction."). Courts are similarly deferential to an agency's interpretation of its own 
rules. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that courts 
should give an agency interpretation of its own regulation "controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"). 
109. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
110. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) 
(observing that generalist federal judges lack administrators' special expertise and "greater 
familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated") (citing 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991)), abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (suggesting that agency policymaking 
enhances democratic accountability by placing regulatory policy more firmly within an 
"incumbent administration's" sphere of influence); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The 
Executive's Power w Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that Chevron 
deference reflects the executive branch's superior expertise and accountability); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State 3 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research 
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 145 2006-2007
Fiduciary Foundations 145 
has stressed on numerous occasions that Chevron rest5 principally upon a theory 
of legislative entrustment: Federal courts presume that Congress delegates 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies to clarify ambiguities and fill gaps 
in the statutes they administer. Justice Scalia explained in Smiley v. Citibank 111 : 
[Courts] accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not 
because . .. they drafted the provisions in question, or were present at 
the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather because of a 
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant 
for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity 
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the 
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discre-
. h b' . ll li Z tton t e am 1gu1ty a ows. 
If statutory ambiguity represents Congress's implicit delegation of 
lawmaking authority, statutory clarity demarcates the outer limits of an 
agency's Chewon authority. An agency's statutory interpretation commands 
Chevron deference only if Congress has charged the agency with adminis-
trative responsibility for the relevant statute; 111 when another agency adminis-
ters the relevant statute, the proffered interpretations are "not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority," though they could still qualify 
as persuasive authority under the weaker Skidmore standard. 114 Similarly, 
Chewon does not permit agencies to construe statutory provisions in a 
manner that would raise significant constitutional concems 11 s or expand the 
agency's discretionary authority outside the fields contemplated by Congress. 116 
Chevron's logic of legislative entrustment thus preserves agency discretion within 
Paper No. 173, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/~bmact=839227 (arguing that the Chevron Court 
"anchored Chevron deference in the relationship between agencies and the President"). 
111. See 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
112. ld. at 740-41; cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference': Implied Delegations, 
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN . L. REV. 735, 746-47 (2002) 
("[l]n Mead the Supreme Court squarely located the requirement of Chevron deference on a theory 
of nn implied delegation of lawmaking power. Under Mead federal courts should afford Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts only when the agency enjoys 
congressionally-delegated power to make quasi-statutory interpretations."). 
113. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 ( 1990), superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1854(d)(l) (2000). 
114. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
115. See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Anny Corps. ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
116. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904,916-17 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (noting that courts may require stronger ev idence of 
legislative entrustment when agencies assert authority to make decisions of great "economic and 
political magnitude"). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329 
(2000) ("jU]nder Chevron, agencies are not merely given authority that is often open-ended; they are 
also permitted to interpret the scope of their own authority, at least in the face of ambiguity."). 
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the scope of legislative delegations (express, implied, or imputed) without 
licensing agencies to expand their delegated authority beyond its intended scope. 
The Court has vacillated over the appropriate methodology for discern-
ing agency entrustment. In most cases, the Court has construed Chevron as a 
presumption "that ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to 
administer are delegations of [lawmaking] authority to the agency to fill the 
statutory gap in [a] reasonable fashion." 117 In United States v. Mead Corp.,118 
however, eight justices cast doubt upon this strong presumption by denying 
Chevron deference to a U.S. Customs Services' tariff classification. According 
to Mead, tariff classifications do not warrant Chevron deference because "the 
terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant 
to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force 
oflaw."119 On its face, Mead's rationale encourages courts to pierce Chevron's pre-
sumption of ambiguity-qua-delegation in search of particularized evidence "that 
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law 
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law."120 
At present, it is unclear how the Court will resolve this tension between 
Chevron's blanket presumption of legislative delegation and Mead's contin-
gent, contextual approach. Yet, however this question is resolved, the mere 
fact that all nine justices appear to accept legislative delegation as the touch-
stone for Chevron deference is itself remarkable. The Court defers to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes to honor agencies' entrusted lawmaking 
117. Nat'! Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet SeiVs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005); 
see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 
490-91 ( 1996) (observing that courts prefer to infer entrustment based on the formation of a 
relationship of trust rather than look for discrete acts of delegation, thereby bypassing the 
"fictional" aspect of legislative intent); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference ro Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (same) . 
118. 533 u.s. 218 (2001). 
119. I d. at 231-32. The Court proceeded to argue that "express congressional authorizations 
to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication" would be "a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment." Id. at 229. But see id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("What was previously a general presumption of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the 
statutes they have been authorized to enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority, 
which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the contrary.") . 
I 20. I d. at 229. Despite its rationale, Mead is probably better understood in reference to 
Congress's expectations for how agencies will exercise delegated lawmaking powers rather than 
whether Congress has delegated lawmaking powers in the first place. When agencies interpret statutes 
informally without invoking their entrusted lawmaking authority, these interpretations are not 
necessarily binding on courts. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
("[Agency) interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law ... do not warrant Chevron-style deference." ); Martin 
v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (stating that interpretive 
rules are "not entitled w the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of [an agency]'s 
delegated lawmaking powers"). 
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authority, not merely to vindicate the executive branch's constitutional powers, 
expertise, or electoral accountability (although these factors clearly 
strengthen the case for deference). ln fairness, it must be conceded that this 
notion of legislative delegation is usually a thinly veiled fiction-though it is 
no greater fiction than private fiduciary law's attribution of entrusted author-
ity to parents, guardians, and other noncontractual fiduciaries. Courts treat 
agencies as possessing authority to resolve ambiguities and fill gaps wherever 
agencies have administrative responsibility for a statutory scheme; whether 
Congress actually intended to delegate lawmaking authority "matters not."111 
Chevron and its progeny thus rest firmly on a fiduciary theory of adminis-
trative entrustment. 
B. Agency Accountability 
Implicit in the Chevron doctrine and other principles of agency entrust-
ment is the expectation that agencies will exercise their authority in a manner 
that honors the delegation's purpose and serves the agency's beneficiaries. As 
in private fiduciary relations, trust lies at the heart of the public's social con-
tract with the administrative state. The rapid growth of federal bureaucracy 
during the New Deal can be traced to the public's shaken faith in unregulated 
markets and enhanced confidence in the federal government during the 1930s 
and 1940s. 111 While recent decades have been marked by greater cynicism 
regarding the trustworthiness of federal regulators and the desirability of federal 
regulation, public trust remains the keystone of administrative governance. 
The federal government's regulatory role in areas ranging from education to 
natural resources to homeland security is made possible by the public's general 
acceptance of administrative agencies as fiduciary institutions capable of 
following legislative directives in good faith, suppressing self-interest, and 
resisting the distorting pressures of pork-barrel politics. The expansion of the 
modem administrative state over the twentieth century can be viewed, 
therefore, as a burgeoning fiduciary compact between federal agencies and the 
American people. 
At the same time, however, the delicate framework of regulatory gov-
ernance can easily decay into corruption, cronyism, factionalism, capricious-
ness, and waste. As stewards over vast public resources and powerful regulatory 
regimes, administrative agencies face extraordinary pressures from both within 
and outside government-not all of which are conducive to conscientious 
121. Chevron U.S.A. , Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984). 
122. See Garland, supra note 5, at 577 . 
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administration, to put it mildly. For decades, political scientists have decried 
the so-called "iron triangles" between private industry, agency administrators, 
and congressional committees, which institutionalize factionalism, entrench-
ing narrow interests in opposition to broad-based progressive reforms. 123 Public 
resources pooled under agency control may also become breeding grounds for 
rent-seeking bureaucrats and unscrupulous lobbyists. Bureaucratic mismanage-
ment can be equally insidious, leading to arbitrary, uninformed, and wasteful 
policies. In many instances, asymmetries in expertise and information can 
frustrate efforts by the president, Congress, and nongovernmental watchdogs 
to monitor agency performance. While agency entrustment is predicated upon 
public trust, the threat of agency mismanagement presents an equally 
compelling case for distrust. 
Distrust of representative government was perhaps the dominant preoc-
cupation of the founding generation, as evidenced during the Constitutional 
())nvention debates, 124 and this legacy lingers as a recurring motif in contempo-
rary administrative law. Administrative law addresses the threats posed by 
agency discretion through the same mechanisms as private fiduciary law: 
residual control and fiduciary duties. ())urrs enforce these bonding mechanisms 
to complement preexisting social norms and to maximize the efficiencies of 
agency specialization. 
1. Executive and Legislative Control 
When regulatory authority vests in an administrative agency, the politi-
cal branches each retain a measure of residual control over the agency's 
performance. For instance, ())ogress may enact new legislation to modify an 
agency's substantive mandate or modus operandi. The president likewise has a 
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"125 and he may demand 
that agency heads make a fiduciary accounting of their activities at any time 
by rendering an opinion in writing "upon any Subject relating to the Duties 
of their ... Offices."126 The president also exerts indirect control over agency 
policy through executive orders requiring interagency coordination and 
123. See CHARLES H. KOCH, ]R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & POLICY§ 7.12 (2d ed. 1997); 
THEODORE j. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22 
(2d ed. 1979); jEFFREY WORSHAM, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: POLICY CHANGE, CONGRESS, AND 
BANK REGULATION 1 (1997). 
124. See MarciA. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 807, 810 (1999) (describing the Constitutional Convention as a veritable "feast of disr:rust") . 
125. U .S. CONST. art . II,§ 3. 
126. I d. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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preregulation agenda setting,m and he may remove administrators 
under appropriate circumstances. 
What is particularly striking about the political branches' control over 
the administrative process, however, is the extent to which this control is 
cabined by separation of powers principles and other legal and practical con-
straints. For example, although Congress sets the terms of agency entrust-
ment, Congress possesses no power to influence agency decisionmaking 
outside the bicameral requirements of Article I. Congress cannot reserve to 
itself the prerogative to revoke agency regulations by "legislative veto"115 or to 
remove administrators who deviate from statutory instructions.129 Nor can it 
appoint its own members or agents as ex officio members of agency commis-
sions110 or authorize the president to "cancel" discrete provisions of statutes 
that have been signed into law.111 Indeed, even Congress's indisputable author-
ity to curtail agency discretion through legislation has limited practical effect 
due to the extraordinary amount of time, coordination, and political capital 
needed for bicameral lawmaking. 
Legal and practical constraints also restrict the president's influence over 
agency administration. The president, like entrustors in private fiduciary rela-
tions, often influences agency behavior through infonnal means-for instance, 
by making recommendations to the administrators he has appointed. Certain 
executive orders also provide for agencies to furnish cost-benefit analyses of 
proposed regulations and alternatives to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), facilitating the president's review of agency regulations.m 
127. See 1 RICHARD j . PIERCE, jR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE* 7 .9, at 498-99 (4th 
ed. 2002) (describing Executive Orders 12 ,291 and 12.498) ; Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administmtion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (discussing efforts by the White House to make 
administrative agencies more responsive to the president's political and policy agendas); Richard 
B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 443 (2003) 
(terming these processes of executive review "analytic management"). 
128. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S . 9 19, 954-55 ( 1983 ); see also id. at 955 ("Congress must abide 
by its delegation of authority until that delegat ion is legislatively altered or revoked.") . 
129. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) ("Once the appointment has been 
made and confirmed, ... the Constitution explicitly provides for removal of Officers of the 
United States by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and 
conviction by the Senate ... on 'Treason, Bribery[,] or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."') 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4); see also id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Wihen 
Congress ... seeks to make policy that will bind the Nation, it must follow the procedures 
mandated by Article I of the Constitution-through passage by both Houses and presentment to 
the President."). 
130. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). 
131. See Clinton v. City of New York. 524 U.S. 417, 436-37 (I 998). 
132. See Stewart, supra note 127, at 443 (describing the rationale behind Executive Order 
12 ,291 ); Richard H. Fildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 0-11. L. REV. I, 3 
(1995) (same). 
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But the president lacks formal authority to prescribe regulatory policy in 
instances where statutes expressly assign decisionmaking to another executive 
officer, and he is ordinarily powerless to alter or abrogate the statutory 
standards for agency discretion. 133 To the extent that agencies set policy through 
adjudicatory processes, due process prevents the president from intervening to 
override decisions by administrative law judges. While it is certainly true that 
the president may remove some errant officers based on policy disagreements, 
Congress has limited this removal authority for most executive 
appointments, 134 and the president lacks formal legal authority to compel these 
officers to follow a prescribed course of conduct. Even where the president 
possesses removal power, the political ramifications of removal and the 
information asymmetries between the president and agencies may frustrate 
executive control.135 
If one accepts the premise that the administrative state's legitimacy 
hinges upon executive or legislative control of agency policy (as posited in 
the transmission-belt and unitary-executive models), the gaping holes in 
the political branches' power to control regulatory decisionmaking strike at 
the heart of agency legitimacy.136 The fiduciary model, in contrast, views these 
constraints as essential to effective agency administration. When Congress 
entrusts critical rights or resources to an administrative agency, it usually does 
so to harness the expertise and efficiencies of institutional specialization. Just 
as corporate boards may inadvertently stymie productivity by attempting to 
micromanage corporate administration, so too may Congress and the presi-
dent stymie regulatory policymaking by maintaining too tight a grip on the 
133 . See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 501. 
134. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that Congress may provide 
for removal of the independent counsel by the attorney general rather than the president); 
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (stressing that Congress's authority 
to limit the president's removal power for certain agencies "cannot well be doubted"); Shapiro, 
supra note 11, at 6 (noting that Congress "can limit the President's authority to remove 
administrators because of policy disagreements" and that "it has done so in the 'independent 
agencies"'); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 409 (1958) ("A principal is privileged to 
discharge before the time fixed by the contract of employment an agent who has committed such 
a violation of duty that his conduct constitutes a material breach of contract .. . . "); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003) (noting that discharge of a trustee is appropriate 
"(a) in accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b) for cause by a proper court"). 
135. As Richard J. Pierce, Jr. has argued, "The greatest constraints on presidential power to 
control agency policymaking are purely practical. It is simply impossible for the President even to be 
aware of all of the policy decisions agencies make." 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 502-03. 
136. See , e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 
115-16 (1988) (arguing that administrative agencies' relative autonomy deprives the president of 
"the independent will that the Founders had in mind when they called for an executive with 
greater energy"). 
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reins of agency rulemaking. Indeed, in contexts where agencies adjudicate 
individual claims or mediate between conflicting factions, one might argue 
that the political branches-like trust settlors-should retain only the limited 
residual control necessary to prevent flagrant malfeasance. Agency discretion 
has its dangers, to be sure, but excessive intermeddling in the regulatory proc-
ess systematically dilutes agency expertise and plunges agency discretion more 
deeply into the mire of partisan politics. 
Whether contemporary administrative law strikes an optimal balance 
between residual control and agency discretion is highly debatable, to be sure. 
There might be good reasons, constitutional or otherwise, for strengthening 
or weakening the political branches' control over certain aspects of the 
administrative process. The more significant point for present purposes, how-
ever, is that the public interest may be best served by a legal regime where neither 
the president nor Congress exercises unqualified control over agency action. 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
The wisdom of constraining executive and legislative residual control 
over the administrative process becomes more apparent when one takes into 
account the other accountability mechanisms embedded in administrative 
law. As in private fiduciary law, administrative agencies owe fiduciary duties 
to their statutory beneficiaries, the ultimate stakeholders in agency action, 
and courts enforce these duties by requiring agencies to discharge them with 
absolute loyalty and reasonable care.m The parallels between private fiduci-
ary duties and agency duties are striking. Agencies are bound to exercise rea-
sonable prudence when exercising delegated powers, and they are forbidden 
from entering self-interested transactions or arbitrarily discriminating 
between similarly situated beneficiaries. Courts enforce these fiduciary duties 
as minimal standards of rationality, consistency, transparency, public delib-
eration, and thoroughness in investigating alternatives. Rather than extract 
agency duties of loyalty and care from the primordial soup of federal common 
137. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 428 ("Unless otherwise agreed, a subagent 
who knows of the existence of the ultimate principal owes him the duties owed by an agent to a 
principal, except the duties dependent upon the existence of a contract.") . Some have suggested that 
fiduciaries also owe duties of loyalty and care to persons other than their beneficiaries. See Stewart 
E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761--62 
(2006) (noting the tension between fidelity to the settlor and fidelity to beneficiaries); Joseph T. 
Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333 (2002) (arguing that under 
current law, corporate directors may owe fiduciary duties to community interests in addition to 
shareholders). 
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law, however, courts have drawn these fidelity norms from the Constitution, 
the APA, and other transsubstantive procedural statutes. 138 
Courts do not necessarily characterize agencies' constitutional and statu-
tory obligations as fiduciary duties, of course. In practice, however, judicial 
"hard look" review of agency rulemaking, "substantial-evidence" review of 
agency adjudication, and other standards of judicial review closely track 
courts' standards for private fiduciary duties. The purpose is not to substitute 
judicial discretion for agency discretion, but rather merely to ensure that 
agencies exercise their discretion through a process that ensures reasonable 
care, loyalty, and transparency. Administrative law calls upon courts to enforce 
agency duties in order to promote fidelity to agencies' statutorily defined 
missions and the best interests of their beneficiaries. 
a. Informal Rulemaking 
The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty play an important, if underap-
preciated, role in structuring the procedural requirements for informal rulemak-
ing. The AP A authorizes agencies to issue legislative rules through a three-step 
process consisting of (1) public notice of the proposed rule; (2) solicitation of 
public comments; and (3) issuance of a final rule containing "a concise general 
statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose."139 Proposed rules must be published 
in the Federal Register at least thirty days before their effective date with a 
description of the legal and factual basis for the agency's decision to give the 
public an adequate opportunity to respond to the proposed rule.140 Over time, 
courts have stretched the "concise general statement" language to require 
increasingly detailed statements of the rule's purposes, factual predicates, and 
anticipated effects, as well as responses to major criticisms and alternatives 
elicited during the notice-and-comment process. 
Traditionally, the AP A's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements 
have been understood as tools for democratizing administrative rulemaking, 
but this vision is largely chimerical. Notice-and-comment procedures may 
138. See Peter H. Schuck, The Administrative Procedure Act, in FoUNDATIONS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 53 ("The APA has been called a quasi-constitutional 
statute, with good reason. If there were no APA, the courts ... would certainly have invented 
something like it in order to implement the constitutional safeguards of the Fifth Amendment's 
due process clause."). 
139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). 
140. Jd. § 553(b), (d); see also Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that 
failure to comply with APA procedural requirements is a ground for remanding a regulation to the 
agency); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.Zd 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that 
an agency's notice was insufficient because the rules were based on "inadequate data, or on data that 
[was] known only to the agency"); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.Zd 1013 (3d Cir. 1972) (same). 
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 153 2006-2007
Fiduciary Foundations 153 
compel agencies to engage interest-group preferences, but interest groups 
have no formal voting rights or veto power in agency rulemaking. Once the 
window for public notice and comment has closed, an agency is free to proceed 
with its proposed course of action despite persistent public objection so long as its 
grounds for rejecting the objections meets minimal standards of rationality. 
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the notice-and-comment process 
decreases interest-group influence by channeling factional pressures into public 
fora where they are subject to heightened public scrutiny. 111 Satisfying these 
minimal procedural requirements might force agencies to consider a broad 
spectrum of perspectives and public values, but the APA does not ensure that 
regulations reflect interest groups' aggregate preferences. 
A more persuasive explanation for notice-and-comment rulemaking 
comes from the fiduciary model: The APA employs notice-and-comment 
procedures as minimalist procedural safeguards akin to the fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty in private law. As the Supreme Court explained, the APA's 
notice-and-comment procedures are best understood as "the maximum proce-
dural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose 
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures."142 Courts may only "hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law." 14 3 To satisfy judicial review under these standards, agencies must 
show they exercised due care by furnishing a full, contemporaneous adminis-
trative record, explaining in detail the rationale for their decisions, and 
validating departures from past decisions.144 Agencies' explanations must address 
141. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 
( 1985) (arguing that "judicial efforts to require disclosure of ex parte contacts ... reflect[] a belief 
that the pluralist understanding of administration threatens to subvert statutory goals by reflecting 
private whim") (citations omitted). 
142. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Oxp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); 
see also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) ("To permit federal district courts to establish 
administrative procedures de now would, of course, render nugatory Congress' effort to insure that 
administrative procedures be designed by those most familiar with the regulatory problems involved."). 
143. 5 u.s. c.§ 706(2). 
144. See INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (holding that an agency's act of 
announcing and then changing "an irrational departure from that policy ... could constitute action that 
must be overturned as 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion' within the meaning of the 
[APAJ"); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (remanding to 
consider whether an alternative approach would be "feasible and prudent" (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 
& Supp. V); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 & Supp. V)); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,416 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) ("This court emphatically requires that administrative agencies adhere to their own 
precedents or explain any deviations from them."); cf. I SCOTT & FRA TCHER, supra note 19, § 2.5, 
at 43 ("If the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the beneficiary and fails to make a full disclosure 
of all ci rcumstances known to him affec ting the transaction, or if the transaction is unfair to the 
beneficiary, it can be set aside by him. These are characteristics of all fiduciary relations ... . "). 
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all salient aspects of a problem, including the relative costs and benefits of 
reasonable alternatives, and persuade courts that the final rule is not inconsis-
tent with the empirical evidence before the agency. 145 Under limited circum-
stances, courts may also set aside agency decisions that are not supported by 
" b . l 'd " " d b th f "146 Th APA h su stanna ev1 ence or are unwarrante y e acts. e t us pro-
vides that administrative agencies, like private fiduciaries, bear the initial 
burden to produce a record demonstrating that their decision was "the prod-
uct of reasoned decisionmaking." 147 
b. Adjudication 
When administrative agencies act through adjudication rather than 
informal rulemaking, courts also enforce the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care 
through constitutional due process and the AP A's procedural requirements. As 
in fiduciary law, courts have been known to wax eloquent on the importance of 
affording agency petitioners a rigorously thorough and impartial hearing. In 
practice, however, courts are usually highly deferential to agency adjudicatory 
proceedings, overturning agency decisions only where the procedures applied 
do not meet minimum procedural requirements or the agency's factual findings 
are either not supported by "substantial evidence" for formal adjudication or 
"arbitrary" and "capricious" for informal adjudication. 148 Although courts may 
emphasize agencies' nonderogable duties of reasonable care and impartiality, they 
give agency adjudicators broad discretion to fashion procedures and remedies 
appropriate to their particular context. Judicial deference to agency adjudicators 
thus reflects an understanding that "Congress places a premium on agency exper-
tise, and [that], for the sake of uniformity, it is better to minimize the opportunity 
for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency." 149 
145. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ; 
Pierce, supra note 11, at 1263 (explaining the significance of State Fann); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) ("To have any 
realistic chance of upholding a major rule on judicial review, an agency's statement of basis and 
purpose now must discuss in detail each of scores of policy disputes, data disputes, and alternatives 
to the rule adopted by the agency."); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 61 (describing the "hard look" 
doctrine's requirements) . 
146. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F). 
147. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; cf. DeMott, supra note 63, at 900 (observing that a fiduciary 
bears the burden to establish that he or she has "dealt candidly and fairly with" beneficiaries) . But 
cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2423-24 (observing that the business-judgment rule in corporate 
law creates "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on 
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company") (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.Zd 805,812 (Del. 1984)). 
148. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). 
149. Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,621 (1966) . 
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In administrative hearings, due process requires that administrative tribu-
nals exercise reasonable prudence in affording procedural safeguards during a 
hearing. These safeguards may include notice of the proposed action and the 
grounds asserted, an opportunity to present reasons why the agency should not 
take a _proposed action, the right to present evidence and receive notice of 
opposing evidence, and the right to written findings of fact and a rational 
explanation for the agency's decision. 150 What reasonable prudence demands 
will vary, however, depending upon the exigencies of each case. As Justice 
Powell reasoned for the majority in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' "'[D]ue process,' unlike 
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances."111 Agencies' hearings therefore "need not take 
the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial" so long as they entail "minimal 
procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular [circumstances] ... and to the 
limited nature of the controversies to be resolved."113 While agencies are often 
encouraged to offer more generous procedural protections, agencies can survive 
judicial review by satisfying the Due Process Clause's minimal requirements. 
The APA provides for courts to defer to formal agency findings that are 
supported by "substantial evidence." In practice, this substantial-evidence 
standard is remarkably similar to the hard-look standard of review for agency 
rulemaking. Courts "consider the whole record" and evaluate the agency's 
rationale in light of "whatever in the record detracts from its weight." 1 1~ Courts 
also greet agency findings of fact or conclusions of law with greater skepticism if 
they contradict the agency's previous findings or holdings. When such 
inconsistencies arise, the onus falls on agency adjudicators to come up with a 
rational explanation for the agency's departure from precedent.111 An agency's 
failure to consider salient facts also may be viewed as grounds for vacating the 
agency's judgment. These principles have little to do with the "substantiality" of 
the evidence before the agency, but they have everything to do with whether 
the agency exercised reasonable prudence in reaching its final determination. 
150. See 2 PIERCE, su{Jra note 127, !i 9.5, at 617 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of 
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L REV. 1267 (1975)); see also 5 U.S.C. !i 557(c)(3)(A) (requiring 8 statement 
of "findings and conclusions, 8nd the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, 
law, or discretion presented on the record" for formal adjudications); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (holding that a reviewing court can demand that an 
agency provide an explanation for an action taken during informal adjudication). 
151. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
152. /d. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ). 
153. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266--67 ( 1970). 
154. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 4 74, 488 (1951 ). 
155. See 2 PIERCE, su{Jra note 127, !i 11.2, at 785--88 (citing inrer alia Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,853 (D.C. Cir. 1970); ITT Cont'l Banking Co. v. FTC. 532 
F2d207,2 l9(2dCir 1976)). 
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In at least one context, however, even "substantial evidence" will not 
protect an agency's formal adjudication from judicial censure: where the record 
suggests that the agency adjudicator had a unique personal stake in the 
decision. Federal law prohibits officers and employees of the executive 
branch from participating in a determination in which he or a relative has a 
direct and substantial financial interest. 156 Where agency adjudicators are 
found to have a particularized pecuniary interest in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing or to have a unique personal bias against a petitioner, federal courts may 
override the agency determination as fruit of the poisonous tree. 157 Like the 
duty of loyalty in private fiduciary law, these prohibitions against self-
interested adjudication have a prophylactic effect, resulting in the vacatur 
and remand of agency determinations that have the appearance of opportunism 
or bias--even if the petitioner cannot demonstrate actual harm. 
Similarly, due process prohibits courts from granting deference to an 
administrative agency's judgment if there is a possibility that idiosyncratic 
institutional interests could compromise the agency's impartiality.158 An exem-
plary case is Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,159 where the Supreme Court 
held that a U.S. Attorney lacked authority to certify to a court that an 
employee "was acting within the scope of his office or employment" for torts 
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).160 The problem with the 
FTCA's certification procedure, the Court explained, was that in cases where 
the alleged tort took place on foreign soil, the U.S. Attorney's certification 
would effectively immunize the defendant officer from civil liability under the 
FTCA.161 The "impetus to certify becomes overwhelming in a case like this 
one," the Court observed, because "the United States Attorney will feel a 
strong tug to certify, even when the merits are cloudy, and thereby 'do a 
favor,' ... both for the employee and for the United States as well, at a cost 
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000) (forbidding executive officials from participating in 
actions in which they or persons or entities closely associated with them have "a financial 
interest"); Exec. Order No. 11,222, 30 Fed. Reg. 6469, 6470 (May 8, 1965) ("Employees may 
not ... have direct or indirect financial interests that conflict substantially ... with their 
responsibilities and duties as Federal employees .... "). 
157. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam) (invalidating a search 
warrant because the justice of the peace received a fee for each warrant issued); Hall v. Marion 
Sch. Dist. No.2, 31 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 1994) (constitutional rights violated where a school board 
was biased against a teacher for critical remarks aimed at board members). 
158. See generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 
13 CORNELLJ.L. & PuB. POL'Y 203 (2004). 
159. 515 u.s. 417 (1995). 
160. Id. at 421-22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)). 
161. Id. at 422. 
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borne solely, and perhaps quite unfairly, by the plaintiff." 162 Hence, 
"[r]ecognizing that a U.S. Attorney, in cases of this order, is hardly positioned 
to act impartially," the Court held that the U.S. Attorney's certification order 
was subject to judicial review and remanded for the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to conduct a full, de novo review of the underlying merits. 
The duty of loyalty also may manifest itself in administrative law not as 
a prohibition against self-dealing but rather as a nondiscrimination norm: 
Absent statutory authorization, agencies may not exercise their discretion in 
a manner that arbitrarily advances or undermines the interests of one faction 
vis-a-vis another. For agency adjudication, no less than for agency rulemak-
ing, "outside review is still necessary to keep organizational insiders honest." 161 
c. Choice of Policymaking Procedures 
Although rarely acknowledged in contemporary case law, the fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty also apply to administrative agencies' choice of 
policymaking procedures. In addition to infonnal rulemaking and adjudi-
cation, agencies may employ a variety of other procedures to deal with novel 
regulatory problems. Examples include regulatory negotiation, licensing, and 
judicial-enforcement actions. The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty apply 
not only to agencies' use of these regulatory tools but also to their choice 
between these tools. 164 
The principle that administrative agencies have broad discretion to 
select their own modus operandi traces its origins to the Supreme Court's 
1947 decision, SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery Il). 165 In Chenery II, the Court 
held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could announce 
new policies in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding "regardless of whether 
those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regula-
tion."166 Although the Court stressed that it would be preferable for the SEC to 
fill holes in the Holding Company Act through "quasi-legislative promulgation 
of rules" rather than adjudication, it declined to require rulemaking procedures 
162. /d. at 427-28. 
163. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 
1335 (1984 ). 
164. Agencies must choose between the discrete policymaking forms permitted by statute. 
Once they have chosen a form for a particular action, they are obliged to honor the form's 
procedural requirements. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 ( 1969) ("There is 
no warrant in law for [an agency] to replace the [APA's] statutory scheme with a rule-making 
procedure of its own invention."). 
165. 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also Magill, sufJra note 82, at 1405 (describing Chenery II as "the 
fountainhead of this doctrine"). 
166. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 201. 
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in the instant case, reasoning that "any rigid requirement to that effect would 
make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with 
many of the specialized problems which arise."167 To preserve the flexibility 
necessary for effective agency action, the Coun concluded that "the choice 
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is 
one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency."168 Subsequent Court cases have reaffirmed Chenery II's basic principle 
that federal courts should not readily second guess an agency's choice of 
policymaking procedures. 
Embedded within this dominant tradition of judicial deference to 
agency choice of procedures is an underappreciated countertradition: Not 
only is an agency's choice of policymaking procedures reviewable, the choice 
may also be reversible if the selected procedures clearly transgress the agency's 
duties of care or loyalty. In NLRB v. BeU Aerospace Co., 169 the Court speculated 
that "there may be situations where the [agency]'s reliance on adjudication 
would amount to an abuse of discretion."170 Some lower courts have seized 
upon this "abuse of discretion" language, together with the APA's arbitrary and 
capricious standard and the principles of due process, to invalidate agencies' 
choice of adjudicatory procedures in contexts where retroactive application 
would give individuals insufficient notice of potential deprivations or pose 
other special burdens.I71 An agency's decision to employ ex ante legislative rules 
rather than ex post adjudication also can be set aside in situations where 
procedural due process mandates an individualized hearing in connection with 
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 172 Furthermore, courts may not 
change course from adjudication to rulemaking or vice versa without giving 
notice to interested parries and making reasonable accommodation for reliance 
167 . I d. at 202. 
168. Id. at 203 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407.421 (1942)). 
169. 416 u.s. 267 (1974). 
170. Id. at 294. The Coun also cautioned, however, that "the choice between rulemaking 
and adjudication lies in the first instance within [an agency)'s discretion." Id . 
171. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 6.9, at 387 (noting that the Due Process Clause and the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of APA § 706(2)(A) have this effect); Magill, supra note 82, at 
1408-10 nn.86-88 & 92; see also White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Fair 
and consistent application of such requirements requires that [agencies] establish written standards 
and regulations."); Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[D)ue 
process requires that selections among applicants [for public housing] be made in accordance with 
'ascertainable standards."') (citation omitted). 
172. See Magill, supra note 82, at 1409; Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161 (1988). 
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interests. 171 Anchoring these decisions is the principle that courts must 
perform some review of an agency's choice of policymaking procedures to 
ensure that agency discretion does not inordinately "increase the likelihood 
of favoritism, partiality, and arbitrariness" in violation of agency duties of care 
and loyalty. 174 
Regrettably, the principle that courts may review an agency's choice of 
policymaking procedures under the APA and the Due Process Clause for rea-
sonable prudence and loyalty remains a shadowy outlier doctrine on the 
periphery of administrative law. Courts rarely entertain invitations to scruti-
nize agencies' choice of procedures where a statute does not prescribe specific 
procedural requirements. If the dangers of agency arbitrariness and oppor-
tunism are to be taken seriously, however, courts must apply the APA's arbi-
trary and capricious test and the Due Process Clause more vigorously as default 
restraints on agencies' choice of policymaking procedures. 
d. Public Accounting 
To facilitate public monitoring, administrative law also compels agen-
cies to satisfy several subsidiary recordkeeping duties. Like private fiduciaries, 
agencies bear nonnegotiable duties to make a timely accounting of their 
activities and produce documents upon request. The president's power to 
demand that agencies give an account of their stewardship for "any Subject 
relating to the Duties of their ... Offices" falls within this category. 175 So too 
does the Statement and Account Clause requirement that the executive 
publish "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures 
of all public Money."176 The Freedom of Information Act permits public access 
to a variety of documents and information, including published descriptions 
of the agencies' methods of operations, procedures, substantive rules, and 
statements of policy. 177 Agencies are also obliged to release copies of all final 
opinions and adjudications, staff instructions that affect the public, and 
records of votes by agency officials. 178 The Government in the Sunshine Act 
173. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 
540-42 (4th eel. 1999) (listing cases); Bressman, supra note 9, at 535 n.348 (describing this as a 
"judicial check for arbitrariness"). 
174. Holmes, 398 F.2cl at 264. 
175. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Individual agency officers must also make extensive 
representations concerning "financial disclosure, conflict of interest, and ethics." 5 U.S.C. app. 
§ 404 (2000). 
176. U.S. CON ST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 7. 
177. 5 U.S. C. § 55Z(a)( 1 ). 
178. /d. § 552(a)(2)-(5). 
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provides for agencies to give advance public notice "of the time, place, and 
subject matter" of certain agency meetings.179 Likewise, FACA requires advi-
sory committee meetings to be open to the public and transcribed, and 
provides for disclosure of virtually all documents used in these meetings. 180 
Where applicable, courts enforce these statutory-disclosure duties to facilitate 
both intergovernmental and public monitoring of agency performance. 
e. Remedies 
In private law, courts may choose from a diverse assortment of equitable 
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, including specific performance, injunc-
tion from future breach, compelled compensation, accounting, appointing a 
receiver, suspending or removing a fiduciary, denying compensation, impos-
ing a constructive trust, or voiding the fiduciary's act. 181 When administrative 
agencies violate their fiduciary obligations, however, courts' remedial options 
are far more limited. Courts ordinarily enforce the Due Process Clause, the 
APA, FACA, and other agency obligations only by declaratory judgment or 
prospective injunction, voiding or enjoining agency actions that are proce-
durally defective, arbitrary and capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary 
to statutory authority. 182 Damages, the typical remedy for fiduciary misappro-
priations, are only available against agencies or agency officials under limited 
circurnstances.183 To the extent plaintiffs might seek more invasive forms of 
relief such as the suspension or removal of an agency official or a constructive 
trust on agency resources, they must pursue these goals through the political 
179. Id. § 552b(e)(l). 
180. !d. § 552b(f). 
181. See Rounds, supra note 21, at A-5; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 199 
(1959) (observing that trust beneficiaries may seek equitable relief to compel performance, enjoin 
a breach of trust, compel the trustee to redress a breach, and, in cases of severe and persistent 
breach, request that the court remove the trustee and appoint a receiver to receive and administer 
the trust property); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 50, at 1074 ("Disgorgement, the usual remedy for 
misappropriation, merely aims to return the agent to a situation similar to the one that she would 
have been in without appropriation."); DeMott, supra note 63, at 900 ("[A beneficiary may obtain) 
restitution of any benefit realized by the fiduciary through the breach, or alternatively may recover 
any loss suffered as a result of the breach."). 
182. The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes a federal court to "declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration" in cases (other than tax) 
"of actual controversy within its jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (2000). 
183. These include suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) 
(authorizing the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to consider tort claims based on the conduct of 
federal officials), the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (authorizing tort actions against 
state or local officials who deprive citizens of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution under color of state law), and implied constitutional causes of action under Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny. 
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process rather than the courts. These limits on judicial relief are not neces-
sarily inconsistent with a fiduciary theory of administrative law, though an 
argument can be made that the demands of equity, popular sovereignty, and 
fiduciary obligation favor giving courts a larger set of tools for remedying 
agency malfeasance. 
C. Administrative Law and Social Norms 
Notwithstanding the many critical executive, legislative, and judicial 
restraints on agency action, the fact remains that the vast majority of agency 
decisions are made with little direct oversight or input from the White House. 
Few agency regulations or adjudicatory determinations are reviewed or 
overturned by the judiciary, and fewer still by Congress or the president. 
Indeed, as discussed previously, administrative law deliberately reinforces 
agency autonomy by restricting the political branches' residual control over 
the administrative process. While agencies' duties of care and loyalty cabin 
agency discretion to a certain extent, they do not displace agencies' discretion 
to choose between reasonable alternatives. 
Viewed from the perspective of the political-control model, which cur-
rently dominates administrative law scholarship, agencies' discretion repre-
sents an unsettling accountability gap that undermines agency legitimacy. The 
emerging fiduciary model, on the other hand, suggests that the apparent 
accountability gap may be more complex than critics ordinarily suppose. Like 
private fiduciary law, the fiduciary model considers legal restraints to be just 
one strand in the intricate web of institutional relations, bureaucratic con-
straints, and social norms that influence agency behavior. In most contexts, 
the extralegal forces that inform agency action have a far more potent effect 
for good or ill than hard legal norms. For example, the president may promote 
a culture of administrative fidelity by appointing agency heads with compati-
ble regulatory philosophies, maintaining informal lines of communication 
with agencies, and fostering constructive public discourse about the adminis-
trative process. 184 Congress shapes the social norms surrounding agency iden-
tity not only through legislation, but also through formal and informal debate 
over pending legislation, formal congressional oversight of the administrative 
process, informal dialogue with agency administrators, and committee hear-
ings on regulatory issues. Foreign regulators and nongovernmental organizations 
184. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 500 ("Presidential reluctance to assert the power 
to implement formal, systematic controls on independent agency policymaking can ... be explained 
in part as a function of the President's knowledge that he can exercise control over 
policymaking ... through less formal, less systematic means."). 
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also play influential roles as evangelists and watchdogs of agency 
professionalism, diligence, and fidelity. 185 To this list one might add the 
multifarious voices of scientists, industrialists, academics, political parties, 
news media, international organizations, and innumerable others. 
The idea that socialization processes serve as the first and most impor-
tant line of defense against agency mismanagement is not unrealistic. Organ-
izational theorists observe that cultural and professional socialization 
processes exert a profound influence upon individual and collective behavior, 
particularly for public-service professions where the norms of loyalty, care, 
and fidelity are deeply engrained in the public conscious. Indeed, one likely 
explanation for administrative law's inattention to the emerging fiduciary 
model of administrative law may be that the fiduciary model is simply taken 
for granted because it is so deeply embedded in public discourse. 
Reputation matters deeply to administrative agencies and the individual 
administrators at their helms. Most agency administrators, like private fiduci-
aries, accept the call to service in no small part because they consider the 
appointment a mark of personal distinction, and they have powerful incentives 
to preserve the honor of their office. Indeed, administrators may care a good 
deal more about the reputational harms that flow from public censure than 
the legal consequences of an adverse judgment (for which they are not usually 
personally liable). An administrator's perceived failure to act with reasonable 
prudence can have devastating reputational costs, as illustrated in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina by the news media's excoriation of Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) director, Michael Brown.186 In short, the 
influence of extralegal norms and social networks can hardly be overestimated. 
Administrative law seeks to complement these extralegal socialization 
processes by walking a fine line between vigilance and deference. The perils of 
underenforcing agency duties are obvious to all, but the effects of overen-
forcement can be equally destructive. Incessant judicial fault finding can breed 
cynicism about the administrative process, make public office less attractive to 
high-quality candidates, decrease the marginal reputational costs of 
administrator malfeasance, and ultimately undermine the trust upon which 
185. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 55 (2004) (observing that 
international regulatory networks give national agencies "an incentive 'to maintain their reputation 
in the eyes of other members of the network"') (quoting Giandomenico Majone, The New 
European Agencies: Regulation by lnfonnation, 4 J. ENVTL. PuB. POL'Y 262, 272 (1997). 
186. See, e.g., ABC News, FEMA Director Removed from Katrina Duty (Sept. 9, 2005), 
http:/ /abcnews.go.com/Politics/HurricaneKatrina/story ?id= 1111 074&page= 1 (reviewing press and 
congressional criticism of Michael Brown's performance, competency, and qualifications). 
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the administrative state itself depends.187 Thus, while courts extol soft norms 
such as loyalty, diligence, impartiality, rationality, and procedural fairness, 
they moderate the political branches' residual control and judicial review in 
reliance on the broader web of institutions, networks, and social norms that 
constitute the administrative state. 
D. Agency Discretion and Public Trust 
The foregoing discussion, sweeping and impressionistic though it might 
be, offers a provocative glimpse of the fiduciary model's quiet ascendancy in 
administrative law, as well as the model's potential to revitalize critical dis-
course concerning agency legitimacy. To examine the administrative state 
through the lens of fiduciary obligation is to see administrative agencies as 
institutions suspended in an intricate web of legal, social, and political con-
straints that infonn and delimit agency discretion. On the one hand, admin-
istrative law empowers the political branches to exercise residual control over 
agency activities and enforces agencies' fiduciary duties as safeguards against 
arbitrariness, opportunism, and waste. But administrative law also places 
restrictions on these accountability mechanisms, entrusting agencies with 
policymaking discretion in order to maximize the benefits from agency spe-
cialization. While legal theorists have tended in the past to treat agency 
expertise, interest representation, and political accountability as competing 
approaches to the problem of agency discretion,188 the fiduciary model 
suggests that these elements should be integrated and coordinated to maximize 
agency fidelity. 
The fiduciary model's vision of agency discretion as public trust might 
strike some as a perilously utopian conception of the administrative state. To 
expect virtue, however, is not necessarily to turn a blind eye to vice. Like 
private fiduciary law, administrative law girds the soft norms of fiduciary obli-
gation with the steely realism of residual political control and judicial review. 
The fiduciary norms embodied in the Due Process Clause, the APA, and 
other procedural statutes give courts the flexibility to counter agency oppor-
tunism, factionalism, arbitrariness, and waste in whatever novel form they 
187. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Scructure of the Fiduciary Relationship 45 (Univ. of Ill. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. LE03-003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397641 
("!Overuse of fiduciary duties] increases litigation and contracting costs, decreases the effectiveness of 
owners' governance rights, and dilutes true fiduciaries ' legal and extralegal incentives."). 
188. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 127, at 439 (reviewing five legal "approaches" to restraining 
agency discretion). 
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might arise. 189 By balancing agency discretion, political control, and fiduciary 
duties, administrative law seeks to enhance agency productivity while at the 
same time cultivating a legal, political, and social climate conducive to con-
scientious governance. 
Ill. DISAGGREGATING THE FIDUCIARY MODEL 
Thus far, this Article has explored the fiduciary model's nuanced 
response to the dilemma of agency discretion without pausing to reflect upon 
agencies' diverse forms and functions. Conventional wisdom assumes that 
agency discretion differs only in degree, 190 but this assumption does not with-
stand close scrutiny. Agencies perform diverse functions, from the conduct of 
national diplomacy, to the management of public lands and property, to the 
licensing of private parties for television and radio broadcasting. Some agen-
cies manage public goods, while others regulate private conduct; some are 
under the president's direct command and control, while others are desig-
nated "independent" and insulated from executive management; some have 
the power to issue legally binding rules, but others play a purely investigatory 
or consultative role. This impressive functional diversity suggests that the 
delegation of authority to administrative agencies may be best understood not 
as a linear continuum but rather as a heterogeneous family of distinct but 
interrelated species. 
One virtue of the fiduciary model is that it offers a flexible framework for 
preserving administrative law from the centripetal forces of agency diver-
sity.191 Like private fiduciary law, administrative law calibrates entrustment, 
residual control, and fiduciary duties in different ways for different types of 
legal relations. Courts typically take for granted that administrative agencies 
189. See Markham, supra note 19, at 256 ("The [fiduciary) concept .. . allows the courts . . . to 
proscribe socially undesirable activities that were not anticipated by the legislature or which are too 
novel for application of the strict confines of the common law. It assures that those who may engage 
in sharp practices and prey on the unwary do not escape retribution through legal loopholes.") . 
190. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New" Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
415 (1989) (Scalia,}., dissenting)). 
191. See E. Donald Elliot, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 
in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 380 (questioning "whether the 
traditional conception of administrative law as 'embrac[ing] all governmental machinery for 
carrying out government programs' remains viable (if it ever was)"); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1670-
71 n.S ("The conception of administrative law as a unified body of doctrine with general 
applicability risks papering over significant differences in administrative functions, agency forms, 
and the sources and operative foci of various administrative law doctrines."); Mark Seidenfeld, 
The Quixotic Quest for a "Unified" Theory of the Administrative State, in ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP ( 2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2. 
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are agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the people as a whole,1' 2 but 
the fiduciary model suggests that other fiduciary relations such as trusts, cor-
porations, and guardianships may also serve as illuminating analogs for 
administrative agencies' roles in public governance. 
A. The Principal-Agent Paradigm 
The traditional principal-agent paradigm posits that administrative 
agencies represent the people or their representatives (the principal) and are 
expected to conform their behavior to the principal's current preferences. 
Agencies receive specific statutory directions and are expected to exercise 
discretion only to respond to complex or unforeseen circumstances. Even 
where circumstances compel agencies to exercise discretion, agencies' choices 
are not intended to be fully discretionary; rather, agencies are expected to 
anticipate how the principal would decide the question under considera-
tion.191 Viewed from this perspective, delegation to administrative agencies 
empowers the government as a whole to act more effectively in more areas 
while maximizing the principal's control over agency performance. 
This principal-agent paradigm, which has been embraced in various itera-
tions by adherents of the political-control model, fits some administrative 
agencies fairly comfortably. Agencies that are subject to direct presidential 
control and closely linked to the president's constitutional powers (for 
example, foreign affairs and national defense) arguably operate in a relationship 
with the political branches that closely parallels traditional principal-agent 
relations. The State and Defense Departments, for example, have cabinet-
level administrators who report directly to the president and may be dismissed 
and replaced at the president's pleasure. In theory, the president has 
authority to set agency policy and to discipline administrators who refuse to 
follow the administration's policy. For such agencies, at least, administrative 
law fashions a fiduciary relationship in which the president and Congress 
exercise managerial authority over agencies as proxies for the sovereign people. 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (asserting that "in 
authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these loca l conditions, Congress was merely 
conferring administrative functions upon an agent"); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & 
Barry R. Weingast , Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 ( 1989) (using a principal-agent model to exa mine 
the roles of Congress and the president in oversight of the administrative process ); Pierce, supra 
note II, at 1239-40 (positing agencies as agents of "the people"); Shapiro, supra note II, at I 
(modeling "the relationship between an agency and its politic<~l overseers-the presidenr and 
Congress-as one of 'principal' and 'agent"'). 
193. See Marga ret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout , A Team Product ion Theory of Cor[JOrate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,258-59 (1999). 
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Strong policy arguments support the principal-agent model where 
administrative agencies discharge core executive functions. As the one elected 
official chosen by and answerable to the entire voting citizenry, the president 
is uniquely situated "to hear and act upon the voice of all the people."194 
Allowing the president to stand in with Congress as a principal for the people 
centralizes administrative policy under executive control, streamlines agency 
decisionmaking, and facilitates agency accountability. 195 The president's 
heightened role arguably energizes and focuses public administration, improves 
inter-agency coordination, and "enable[s] the President to defend himself 
from constitutional encroachments on his powers by the legislature."196 
Conventional wisdom holds that the president also stands above the fray of 
regional politics and thus is better positioned than Congress to withstand 
f . l 197 acuona pressures. 
For pure executive agencies, the president's strong residual-control rights 
may also soothe anxiety about agency countermajoritarianism.198 When 
Congress delegates authority to an agency rather than resolve the disputed 
issue itself, it distances regulatory policy from majoritarian democratic 
processes. Administrative agencies that have a national agenda and regulate a 
diffuse nationwide class may face strong temptations to abuse their authority 
to advance narrow interests-for example, by awarding government contracts 
194. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987,990-91 (1997). 
195. See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modem State: Why a Unitary, Centralized 
Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827,845,847 (1996). 
196. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 37; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1995) ("In order to be faithful to the original 
design . . . the interpreter must see as part of the constitutional structure a constraint not explicitly 
stated in that design, requiring that certain kinds of [administrative] policymaking remain within 
the control of the executive."). 
197. See Kagan, supra note 127, at 2335 ("[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, 
he is likely to consider in setting the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the 
preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests."). But see Jide Nzelibe, 
The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006) 
(describing and critiquing this conventional wisdom). 
198. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19-20 (1962); Rebecca 
L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 553 (1998) 
(reviewing the countermajoritarian difficulty in administrative law). Some scholars argue that 
administrative agencies are, in fact, fundamentally promajoritarian institutions because notice-
and-comment procedures make them more accessible to the public input than the president or 
Congress. See, e.g., jERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 144 (1997) (arguing 
that vague delegations reduce legislative logrolling by taking issues out of Congress's hands); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 180 ("Strangely enough it may make sense to imagine the 
delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness of 
government to the desires of the electorate."). 
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to favored contractors outside fair and open bidding processes199-and they 
are therefore good candidates for strong residual control. 
Fitting within the principal-agent paradigm are such diverse institutions 
as the Defense Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal 
Revenue Service, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. Direct 
presidential control over these and other agencies enhances the energy of 
government, improves interagency coordination, and places agency action 
more firmly within the realm of electoral accountability. While the president 
may also face regional or factional pressures, White House review at least 
provides a second tier of oversight, decreasing the danger of agency capture. 
The president's heightened residual control thus helps to ensure that legisla-
tive appropriations for national purposes or charitable causes do not become 
hot spots for rent seekers, industry insiders, and other opportunists. 
The principal-agent paradigm is far less compelling both descriptively 
and prescriptively, however, when the spotlight moves from core executive 
agencies, such as the State Department and the Defense Department, to other 
species of agencies within the administrative state. Many administrative 
agencies perform roles that bear little resemblance to traditional principal-
agent relations but mirror trusts, corporations, guardianships, or other fiduciary 
relations. For every agency headed by cabinet-level administrators who 
report directly to the president, there is an independent regulatory commission 
or quasi-independent federal corporation that breaks the principal-agent 
mold. 100 Many administrative agencies exercise authority by delegation from 
Congress with relatively little presidential control. If the administrative state 
must be viewed solely from a principal-agent perspective, the administrative 
state's legitimacy would be in serious jeopardy. 
Even ardent supporters of the political-control model acknowledge that 
heightened political control is not desirable in all contexts. Excessive politi-
cal intermeddling in fields such as environmental regulation or federal interest 
rates could significantly diminish the returns from agencies' special expertise 
and result in distorted policies that do not reflect the public's long-term 
199. See , e.g., Mary Curtis & Joel Havemann, A Long Road to Recovery: FEMA Reopening Its 
No-Bid Contracts , L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at A21; CBS News, Pentagon Probes Halliburton Bid 
(Oct. 25, 2004 ), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/ll /nationaVmain635356.shtml (describing 
claims by "a top Army contracting official that a Halliburton Co. subsidiary unfairly won no-bid 
contracts worth billions of dollars for support services in Iraq and the Balkans"). 
200. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583-84 (1984 ). The Freedom of Information Act defines 
the tenn "agency'' to "include[] any executive department, Government corporation, Government 
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government ... , or any 
independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S. C.§ 552(1)( 1) (2000). 
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priorities.zo1 As the president's control over an agency increases, the potential 
efficiency and expertise gains from the fiduciary relation decrease, weakening 
Congress's incentive to delegate in the first place.202 Moreover, few would 
dispute that certain forms of agency action, such as the Veterans 
Administration's adjudication of individual disability claims or the Social 
Security Administration's adjudication of social security benefits, should be 
decided on a case-by-case basis by neutral administrative law judges rather 
than by elected officials through traditional political processes.203 Nor would 
it seem wise to replace the trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust 
funds with agents who could be dismissed at the president's pleasure.204 For 
agencies such as these, it might be appropriate to look beyond the principal-
agent paradigm. 
B. Alternative Paradigms: Trust, Corporation, and Guardianship 
Where administrative agencies exercise independent rulemaking or 
adjudicatory functions, administrative law tracks trust law more closely than 
agency law. Consider, for example, so-called independent agencies such as the 
FTC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which 
manage public resources and regulate private interests for the people as a 
whole. When these agencies exercise rulemaking authority pursuant to an 
implicit delegation from Congress, they are not necessarily expected to 
anticipate how Congress or the president would respond to novel regulatory 
201. See Merrill, supra note 74, at 2153 ("Broad delegation is necessary .. . to leverage up the 
lawmaking function of government in order to generate the volume of regulations necessary to carry 
out the wide-ranging functions of modem government."); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 20 ("[O)versight 
by generalists is more likely to improve the rationality of regulatory policy when it supplies the 
general preferences or values that an agency should follow. In other words, overseers are unlikely 
to improve the regulatory process when they engage in micromanagement.") (footnote omitted) . 
202 . See David Epstein & Sharyn O 'Halloran, The Nondelegatian Doctrine and the Separation 
of Powers : A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 963 (1999) ("[D)elegation 
implies surrendering at least some control over policy, and legislators will be loathe to relinquish 
authority in politically sensitive policy areas where they cannot be assured that the executive 
branch will carry out their intent."); Krent, supra note 97, at 748 ("Presumably, the more that 
couns require the President ro exercise control over all agencies, the less attractive that delegation 
becomes from Congress' standpoint. Congress would be less able to influence the exercise of 
delegated authority and thereby earn the gratitude of constituents.") . 
203 . See Fitts, supra note 195, at 852. 
204. The Social Securiry and Medicare trust funds are administered by a board of trustees 
comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the Commissioner of Social Security, and two additional members appointed by 
the president and confirmed by the Senate. See SOCIAL SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OFTRS., STATUS 
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORTS (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html. 
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problems. Instead, these agencies have broad discretion to exercise their dis-
cretion according to their own perception of the public interest, as informed 
by their unique expertise and experience.205 Congress deliberately insulates 
these agencies from the president's "coercive influence" by providing that the 
president may remove administrators only "for good cause"-the same stan-
dard applicable to trustees. 206 
For independent regulatory agencies, the trustee analogy has an addi-
tional advantage: It accounts for the pluralistic interests that are implicated in 
agency entrustment. Whereas the principal-agent paradigm envisions a binary 
relation between agencies and the political branches, the trust paradigm treats 
administrative agencies' beneficiaries as distinct stakeholders in administrative 
regulation. As discussed previously, many agencies direct their services at a 
subset of the voting citizenry, noncitizens, or groups that cut across national 
allegiances. For agency activities that affect Indian tribes, for example, the 
Supreme Court has proclaimed this trustee-beneficiary relationship explicitly, 
stating that the federal government "has charged itself with moral obligations 
of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct ... should therefore be judged 
by the most exacting fiduciary standards."207 The agency and trust paradigms 
thus entail distinct roles and relations (bilateral vs. multilateral) and 
emphasize different types of discretion (implementation vs. policymaking) and 
different values (public will vs. public welfare, flexibility vs. commitment). 
Congress typically designs administrative agencies according to the trust 
paradigm rather than the agency paradigm when it wishes to enhance the 
205. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding a delegation to 
the Price Administrator to set prices that "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will 
effectuate the purposes of this Act") (quoting Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 2(a), 56 Stat. 23, 
24 (1942) (emphasis added)). 
206. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,410-11 (1989) (citation omitted); see also 
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,629 (1935) (discussing the "for cause" standard); 
cf. R2>'TATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003) (providing that trustees may be removed "(a) in 
accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b) for cause by a proper court"). The Court indicated 
in Humphrey's Execuwr that the president would have broader constitutional removal authority over 
"purely executive officers" based on the general principle that "lw]hether the power of the President 
to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power ... wiU 
depend upon rhe character of rhe office." Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631-32 (emphasis added). 
207. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); see also Morongo Band of 
Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It is true that agencies of the federal 
government owe a fiduciary responsibility to Indian tribes.") (citations omitted); Leonard M. 
Baynes, Deregulatory Injustice and Electronic Redlining: The Color of Access to Telecommunications, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 308 (2004) ("[P]ursuant to their trust responsibility , federal 
administrative agencies have to meet strong fiduciary standards in their dealings with American 
Indians unless Congress, through its plenary power, has expressly authorized the agency to depart 
from them."). 
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credibility of regulatory decisions and forge commitment.208 Agency independ-
ence arguably enhances the credibility of agencies' adjudicatory and 
rulemaking proceedings by distancing agency decisions from the political 
process. Establishing independent administrative agencies also promotes con-
tinuity of policy from administration to administration, since independent 
agencies are bound to perform their statutory functions in good faith even if 
the statutory standards set by Congress become politically unpalatable to the 
current administration. The cadre of commitment-reinforcing agencies might 
include such diverse institutions as the Department of Veterans Affairs, the 
ITC, and the National Labor Relations Board. Insulating these agencies from 
presidential control increases the likelihood that federal agencies will identify 
appropriate beneficiaries through rational, legalistic processes rather than 
based on political preferences. While Congress's decision to entrust authority to 
these independent agencies might dilute Congress's accountability and 
diminish the president's ability to shepherd regulatory policy, agency auton-
omy also reduces the risk that majoritarian political pressures will undermine 
statutory objectives and thereby enhances the perceived credibility of agency 
decisionmaking. Indeed, one reason why Congress insulates independent agen-
cies from the president's control is precisely to prevent short-term majori-
tarian pressures (to which the president may be uniquely vulnerable} from 
compromising enduring statutory or constitutional commitments. 
Other private fiduciary relations might also serve as useful paradigms for 
conceptualizing certain types of administrative agencies. Where legislation 
tasks administrative agencies (generally at the state level) with fulfilling the 
state's parens patriae responsibilities for juveniles or the mentally disabled, the 
fiduciary law of guardianship might also serve as a useful model for agency 
authority. Federal corporations such as the Federal Depository Insurance 
Corporation hew to the corporate form more closely than the principal-agent 
or trust paradigms. Certain independent regulatory commissions such as the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), the ITC, and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission arguably perform a "mediating hierarch" role analogous to cor-
porate directors by intermediating conflicts between political parties, gov-
ernment bodies, voters, interest groups, and other groups in order to 
maximize value for the state as a whole. 209 These corporate law paradigms 
208. See ELY, supra note 4, at 87-88; Brown, supra note 198, at 550 (reviewing the 
countermajoritarian difficulty in administrative law) . 
209. For an introduction to the "mediating hierarch" conception of corporate directors, see 
Blair & Stout, supra note 193, at 284-85. In contrast to the agency and trust paradigms, corporate 
paradigms tend to view administrative agencies as stakeholders in the regulatory process. See Victor 
Brudney, Contract arui Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 624 (1997) ("In the 
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draw upon Robert Reich's v1s1on of agency administrators as quasi-
independent "interest-group intermediators" who may maximize social welfare 
and advance social learning about the stakes of regulation.210 In contrast to 
pure executive agencies, independent agencies that stand apart from partisan 
politics and set the ground rules for the political branches' exercise of political 
power serve as process-reinforcing or pluralism-reinforcing referees rather 
than reflexive servants of the president's majoritarian will.m 
C. Disaggregating Agency Fidelity 
In proposing trusts, corporations, guardianships, and other private fidu-
ciary relations as alternatives to the agency paradigm, I do not intend to sug-
gest that all administrative agencies can, or should, be pigeon-holed within 
one of these private-law paradigms. Analogies between administrative agencies 
and particular fiduciary relations become artificial, constrictive, and ulti-
mately absurd if stretched too far. As with any metaphor that bears a kernel of 
tmth, however, comparisons between administrative law and the various 
branches of fiduciary law are useful for highlighting distinctions that might 
otherwise elude detection. 
Perhaps most important, the emerging fiduciary model in administrative 
law reveals the competing visions of public trust that are implicit in agency 
diversity. The principal-agent model focuses on agencies' fidelity to majority 
will by placing agencies firmly under the management of the incumbent 
president-the one elected official who is accountable to a national constitu-
ency and therefore uniquely sensitive to evolving national preferences. The 
trustee paradigm, in contrast, calls upon independent agencies to honor fixed 
legislative commitments so as to enhance the credibility of administrative policy 
over time. For the corporation and corporate-director paradigms, agency fidelity 
might be measured against a different set of metrics such as the degree of public 
participation in interest-group deliberation or the agency's objective 
efficiency and productivity. The fiduciary model does not necessarily privilege 
any particular vision of agency fidelity, nor does it offer guidance as to which 
fiduciary paradigm Congress should employ in any particular context. 
case of trusts or principal and agent relationships (and pro tanw of corporate management), the 
fiduciary must act for the beneficiary's exclusive benefit, and, in the case of partnership or 
corporate controllers for their shared benefit in proportions designated ex ante."). 
210. Reich, supra note 5, at 1626-27 . 
211. William Eskridge offers pluralism facilitation as a refinement of John Hart Ely's 
representation-reinforcement mcxlel in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Disrrusr: How 
Courts Can SufJporc Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Policies , 114 YALE L.J . 12 79 (2005 ). 
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Instead, the fiduciary model honors Congress's autonomy as proxy settlor for 
the people to select the type of agency entrustment and the corresponding 
vision of agency fidelity that best matches the public's own conception of the 
bl , OO ZIZ pu tc go . 
IV. FIDELITY BY DESIGN 
By highlighting the fiduciary norms implicit in administrative law, the 
interpretivist fiduciary model also reveals areas where administrative law fails 
to accomplish its purposes and provides strategies for refining the law to enhance 
agency fidelity. By way of illustration, this part examines two areas where the 
model pushes administrative law in new directions: ( 1) beneficiary standing 
to challenge agency action; and ( 2) due process restraints on agency action. 213 
A. Standing and Representation 
If administrative agencies serve as fiduciaries by delegation from the 
people, how should this understanding inform standing doctrine? Some 
scholars have suggested that agencies' representative role militates in favor of 
a sweeping expansion to citizen standing. Others have advocated scrapping 
standing as an analytic step independent of the cause of action.214 The fiduci-
ary model offers an intermediate solution: Courts should preserve standing 
doctrine's "zone-of-interests" test but expand the set of Article III "injuries in 
fact" to embrace abstract injuries that undermine agency accountability. 
The fiduciary model posits standing as an inquiry into the plaintiffs 
interest, injury, and ability to represent the beneficiary class. In private fiduciary 
law, beneficiaries and their representatives are the only parties who have 
standing to bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Principals may sue their 
agents to recover property lost to self-interested transactions. Trust beneficiaries 
may sue trustees for breach of fiduciary duty once they demonstrate their 
individual beneficial interest to the court.215 Likewise, corporate derivative 
212 . See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The authority of 
Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of 
their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted .... ") . 
213 . Clearly, these two proposals are mere starting points for future investigation of the 
fiduciary model's neglected normative dimensions. I suspect that other valuable insights could be 
gained, for example, by subjecting administrative law to more rigorous linguistic and economic analysis. 
214. See , e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Scruccure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J . 221 (1988); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) ; Cass R. 
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article Ill , 91 MICH. L. REV. 
163 (1992) . 
215 . See 3 SCOTI & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 214, at 318. 
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suits are premised on the notion that corporate officers owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholder beneficiaries. In fiduciary relations where no particular beneficiaries 
have a justiciable interest in the fiduciary's performance (for example, charitable 
trusts), the state attorney general or another designated public official may 
represent the inchoate class of beneficiaries in a suit to enforce the fiduciary's 
duties. 216 Courts generally grant standing liberally to those who can establish 
a discrete injury arising from a beneficial interest, provided that the prospective 
litigant establishes that he will adequately represent the interests of his 
similarly situated co-beneficiaries. Fiduciary law thus grants standing liberally 
to those who have a justiciable interest, but it also seeks "to protect the 
interests of the other beneficiaries" from inadequate representation. 
Standing in administrative law is similar to private fiduciary law in 
many respects. Where individuals seek to vindicate rights conferred by fed-
eral statute, courts examine "whether the interest sought to be protected by 
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."217 Many fed-
eral statutes, like trusts, create beneficial interests or impose special burdens 
upon limited classes rather than the people as a whole. The Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978m expressly prohibits judicial review except for actions initiated 
by gas producers. The Federal Communications Act, for its part, takes a more 
liberal approach, granting standing to "any ... person aggrieved or whose 
interests are adversely affected by any [agency] decision."219 Absent an express 
provision for judicial review, courts look to the statutory scheme as a whole 
for signs as to whether Congress intended to draw a particular class of plaintiffs 
within the statute's zone of interests. When in doubt, courts tend to resolve 
ambiguities in favor of inclusion in the zone of interests.220 The zone-of-interests 
test thus aims to identify the parties whom Congress has identified as 
interested stakeholders in the regulatory process. 
Aside from the prudential zone-of-interests test, the Supreme Court has 
held that the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III limits standing to 
216. See 4A id. § 348, at 5. 
217. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (emphasis added). 
Within the confines of Article III, Congress may expand or narrow "the class of people who may 
protest administrative action." /d. at 154. 
218. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
219. 3 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 16.9, at 1189 (citation omitted). 
220. See, e.g., Nat'! Credit Union Admin. v. First Nm'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 
498 ( 1998) (holding that the applicable test is whether a particular plaintiff is arguably within the 
"zone of interests," not whether Congress "specifically intended to benefit a particular class of 
plaintiffs"); Camp, 397 U.S. m 154 ("[T]he trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who 
may protest administrative action."). 
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plaintiffs who can establish that "the challenged action has caused him injury 
in fact." 221 This "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing"222 demands 
that a plaintiffs injury be "concrete," "particularized,"223 or "distinct and 
palpable."224 Put simply, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by 
the requested relief."225 Article III thus prevents federal courts from dispensing 
advisory opinions on abstract legal questions and ensures that a litigant's 
personal stake in the litigation will be sufficient "to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so 
largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions."226 
Applying the injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court has stressed 
repeatedly that individuals' "abstract" interest in the federal government's 
fidelity to constitutional and statutory norms does not give rise to private 
standing. This principle, like the zone-of-interests test, has prudential under-
tones: Allowing a private citizen to air "general grievances" against adminis-
trative agencies in federal court would "convert the Judiciary into an open 
forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the perform-
ance of govemment."227 "The proposition that all constitutional provisions are 
enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiar-
ies of those provisions has no boundaries," the Court has warned. 228 Implicit in 
this justification are two assumptions: ( 1) Agencies are otherwise accountable to 
the people for their performance through the political branches; and (2) selective 
enforcement of agency duties by Congress and the president is more likely to 
reflect the will of the people as a whole than private "special-interest" 
221. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added); see generally 3 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 16.3, 
at 1118-21. The APA likewise grants standing to persons "suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). 
222. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
223. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984). 
224. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see aLso Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 
U.S. 871, 894 (1990) ("[W)e intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the 
extent that, a specific 'final agency action' has an actual or immediately threatened effect.") 
(citation omitted). 
225. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted); see aLso Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
226. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962)); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974) 
("Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who 
argue within the context, is capable of making decisions."). 
227. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
228. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227. 
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litigation.219 Viewed from this perspective, the Court's prudential approach 
toward abstract injuries can be seen as a promajoritarian approach to standing. 
This vision of Article lll's injury-in-fact requirement is consistent 
with-if not necessarily compelled by-the fiduciary model of the adminis-
trative state. In private law, beneficiaries commonly enforce their interests in 
fiduciary petformance through intermediators. For example, principals typi-
cally rely on their direct agents to monitor and enforce subagents' fiduciary 
duties as "the subagent's principal and the guarantor of his petformance."210 
When subagents violate their fiduciary duties to principals, principals ordi-
narily enforce fiduciary duties by seeking relief in the first instance from their 
direct agents rather than their subagents. Corporate law takes this preference a 
step further, requiring aggrieved shareholders to ask the corporation as a 
whole to take action before filing their own independent derivative suit 
against management. Fiduciary law permits private enforcement actions under 
limited circumstances, but it treats suits by individual beneficiaries as, at best, 
a second-class mechanism for remedying breaches of fiduciary duty. 
In contrast to fiduciary law, the Court's prudential approach to abstract 
injuries in the administrative law context generates enforcement loopholes in 
situations where beneficiaries' discrete and insular status or agency actions 
undermine their ability to enforce fiduciary duties through the political process. 
This problem is likely to arise in the context of independent agencies; where 
the president's control over agencies is weak, the incumbent administration 
may struggle to hold independent agencies accountable for breaching the 
duties of care and loyalty. More troubling still are agency actions that interfere 
with the political process directly by, for example, restricting voting rights or 
concealing agency activity from public scrutiny. If the Court's antipathy toward 
abstract or "generalized" injuries reflects a commitment to democratic represen-
tation, its heavy prudential gloss should dissolve when agency actions threaten 
the democratic process itself.m 
The Court has taken some small steps toward recognizing the need for 
broader citizen standing in cases where the political process could not effectively 
229. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 ( 1972); see also Valley Forge Christian Coli. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 488--90 (1982) (arguing aga inst a 
departure from the requirement of a concrete injury in fact because this wou ld treat "[t]he 
existence of injured parties who might not wish to bring suit [as] irrelevant"). 
230. W. EDWARD SELL, SELLON AGENCY 130-31 (1975). 
231. Once again, these observations from the fiduciary model dovetail nicely with representation-
reinforcement responses to agency countermajoritarianism. According to Ely's famous formula, 
democratic institutions may delegate decisions to institutions that are nor directly accounwble to 
the people where necessary to safeguard the rights of discrete and insular minori ti es. See Anupam 
Chander, Globalization and Disrrust, 114 YALE L.J . 1193, 1203 (2005) (outlining "Ely's sy llogism"). 
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remedy abstract or general injuries. In FEC v. Akins,232 for instance, the Court 
held that a group of U.S. citizens had standing as voters to enforce the 
Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA)233 recordkeeping and disclosure 
requirements for groups that qualify as "political committee[s]."234 Justice Breyer, 
writing for the majority, held that plaintiffs' "injury in fact" was "their inability 
to obtain information-lists of [political committee] donors ... and campaign-
related contributions and expenditures" allegedly required by law.235 Although 
such "informational" injuries are not ordinarily considered to have the 
"concrete" character necessary to survive Article Ill, the case for private 
standing becomes more compelling when coupled with Justice Breyer's 
observation that the "injury at issue [is] directly related to voting, the most 
basic of political rights."236 Since the FEC's failure to enforce the FECA's 
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements eviscerated the public's right to 
monitor activity that could potentially prejudice the electoral system as a whole, 
the Court acted reasonably in setting aside its prudential antipathy toward 
abstract injuries under Article Ill. 
This representation-reinforcement conception of Article Ill standing 
has not always prevailed. In United States v. Richardson,237 the Court held 5-4 
that individual U.S. citizens and taxpayers lack standing to challenge the 
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) refusal to disclose its expenditures as 
required under the Statement and Account Clause.238 In the majority opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court did not deny that the plaintiffs had 
an interest in the CIA's prospective disclosure but concluded that the interest 
was nonjusticiable because it was "plainly undifferentiated and 'common to 
all members of the public."'239 The majority reasoned that the duty to enforce 
the CIA's disclosure duties "is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and 
ultimately to the political process" because "[a]ny other conclusion would mean 
that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an 
Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct 
of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts."240 
232. 524 u.s. 11 (1998). 
233. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431--455 (2000)). 
234. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13. 
235. Id.at21. 
236. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). 
237. 418 u.s. 166 (1974). 
238. Id. at 167-68. 
239. Id. at 177 (citing Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633,634 (1937) (per curiam); Laird v. Tatum, 
408 u.s. 1, 13 (1972)). 
240. Id. at 179. 
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Although spumed by the Richardson majority, the representation-
reinforcement theory of Article III finds eloquent expression in Richardson's 
four dissents. Consider Justice Douglas's rebuttal: 
History shows that the curse of government is not always venality; 
secrecy is one of the most tempting coverups to save regimes from 
criticism .. . . 
The sovereign in this Nation is the people, not the bureaucracy. 
The statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart of 
the problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary 
question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret 
bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs . . . . The mandate [of Article I, 
Section 9, clause 7] runs to the Congress and to the agencies it creates to 
make "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expen-
ditures of all public Money." The beneficiary-as is abundantly clear 
from the constitutional history-is the public. The public cannot intel-
ligently know how to exercise the franchise unless it has a basic 
knowledge concerning at least the generality of the accounts under every 
head of government. 241 
Justice Stewart's complementary dissent links this vision of popular sovereignty 
to principles of private legal obligation: 
When a party is seeking a judicial determination that a defendant owes 
him an affirmative duty, it seems clear to me that he has standing to 
litigate the issue of the existence vel non of this duty once he shows that 
the defendant has declined to honor his claim .... 
. . . It seems to me that when the asserted duty is, as here, as particu-
larized, palpable, and explicit as those which courts regularly recognize in 
private contexts, it should make no difference that the obligor is the 
Government and the duty is embodied in our organic law. 242 
The common threads interlacing FEC and the Richardson dissents are 
the corollary principles that administrative agencies bear a duty of solemn 
fidelity to the law, and that the beneficiaries of agency action must have an 
adequate opportunity to monitor and redress agency lawlessness--if not through 
the political process, then through civil actions in federal courts. These 
principles apply not only to so-called "informational harms" such as those 
alleged in FEC and Richardson, but also to political harms related to voting 
rights, free speech and press rights, and other violations of administrative 
241. /d. at !98, 201 (Douglas, J.,dissenting) . 
242. /d. at 203--04 (Stewart, J., dissenting) . 
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agencies' general duties of loyalty or care.243 The principles may also apply 
where independent agencies exercise discretion with little executive or 
legislative oversight or control. If agencies abuse their discretion in a context 
where citizens cannot vindicate their interests through the political process, 
individual citizens' abstract or generalized interests in agency legality should 
satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. 
Of course, expanding federal jurisdiction under Article III to allow pri-
vate enforcement actions in cases such as FEC and Richardson merely 
exchanges one representation dilemma for another. Private parties who sue 
administrative agencies to enforce the agencies' constitutional or statutory 
duties step into the agencies' shoes as a "representative of the public interest" or 
"private attorney general."244 Granting individuals standing to enforce agency 
duties thus raises the same dangers of opportunism, collusion, and carelessness 
that haunt administrative law generally, and courts should take appropriate 
action to ensure that private litigants adequately discharge their fiduciary 
responsibilities. As in derivative actions, courts could demand that private liti-
gants not only exhaust all available administrative remedies but also file for-
mal grievance notices with the White House or Congress. Better still, courts 
could require prospective plaintiffs to demonstrate that they will adequately 
represent the public interest as a whole. Petitions to participate as amicus 
curiae in representative citizen suits could be granted liberally. Courts could 
also emphasize plaintiffs' fiduciary duties to the public in suits to enforce 
general constitutional and statutory norms. 245 These measures would ensure that 
agencies are accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties while 
protecting the public from arbitrary, wasteful, or opportunistic behavior by the 
private attorneys general who litigate on its behalf. 
B. Recalibrating Agency Duties 
A second proposal that arises from the fiduciary model addresses the 
delicate balance between administrative agencies' discretion and account-
ability: Administrative law should apply agencies' procedural duties of care and 
243. Cf. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that individuals who reside in 
a district that is the subject of a racial-gerrymandering claim do not have standing to challenge 
legislation creating that district unless they were personally subjected to racial classification). 
244. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 ( 1972). 
245. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949) (noting 
that stockholders in derivative lawsuits sue as fiduciaries for other stockholders) (citing Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). 
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loyalty more rigorously in contexts where the political branches' formal 
constraints on agency behavior are weak. 
In private fiduciary law, courts calibrate fiduciary duties differently for 
different types of fiduciary relations to account for the variability of benefici-
ary control. "The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the 
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty," Austin Scott explains.246 
"Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent upon 
whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only 
as a member of the board of directors . ... "147 The scope and potency of a 
fiduciary's duties to beneficiaries is directly related to the vulnerability of 
beneficiaries. Trustees are subject to broader duties of care and loyalty than 
agents because they enjoy more autonomy than most other fiduciaries and 
are not subject to the market forces that protect shareholders in public 
corporations, both of which heighten the dangers of trustee mismanagement. 
Trust beneficiaries cannot readily trade their beneficial interests for interests 
in other trusts if they are dissatisfied with the trustee's performance. Because 
beneficiaries are more vulnerable to trustee shirking or cheating, courts tend 
to enforce trustees' fiduciary duties more strictly than the fiduciary duties of 
. 248 
agents or d1rectors. 
Administrative law should internalize the lessons of private fiduciary law 
and enforce administrative agencies' duties more strictly in contexts where 
agencies operate at a greater remove from executive control. Consider, for 
example, the respective roles of ordinary U.S. Attorneys offices within the 
Department of Justice (DO]) and the office of independent or special counsel, as 
designated for ad hoc investigations of high-ranking government officials. 249 
Both U.S. Attorneys and special counsel are federal prosecutors. Both are vested 
with discretion to determine the amount of resources devoted to a particular 
investigation, how the investigation will be conducted, whether to dose the 
investigation or seek an indictment, the persons against whom indictments will 
be sought and on what charges, whether to accept a guilty plea, and what 
recommendations the government will make for sentencing. However, because 
the special counsel enjoys greater autonomy from executive oversight, the 
246. Scott, supra note 245, at 541. 
24 7. /d. ; see also Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligatirm, 9 OXIDRD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 319 
( 1989) (obsetving that fiduciary obligations depend on the nature of the trust reposed in the entiry}. 
248. See Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2423. 
249. The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000), which previously 
governed the appointment of independent counsel for investigation of executive officials, expired 
in July 1999 but remains in effect with respect to matters pending before previously appointed 
independent counsel. See id. § 599. 
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fiduciary duties of loyalty and care should exert an even stronger gravitational 
pull upon the special counsel than they do upon ordinary federal prosecutors. 
For ordinary federal prosecutions, concerns about the dangers of prose-
cutorial discretion are mitigated by strong political and social controls. The 
attorney general, U.S. Attorneys, and inferior officers operate under the 
White House's oversight and serve at the president's pleasure. Congress also 
monitors the DOJ's activities and influences the OOJ's performance through 
oversight hearings and its firm grip on the DO]'s purse strings. Budgetary 
constraints ordinarily force the DO] to concentrate its limited resources on 
cases where criminal charges are most likely to stick. Concerns for institu-
tional reputation and the preservation of an amicable working relationship 
with courts may also deter federal prosecutors from abusing their prosecutorial 
discretion. Perhaps most important, the adversarial testing of federal prosecu-
tions before impartial courts has a powerful sanitizing effect upon prosecu-
torial discretion, dramatically reducing the threat of arbitrary or vindictive 
prosecutions. These checks do not necessarily guarantee that federal prosecu-
tors will do their job well, but they do diminish the risk that they will squan-
der public resources, arbitrarily single out individuals for investigation, or 
abuse their discretion in pursuit of personal interest. 
Few of these political and institutional constraints apply to an inde-
pendent counsel or special counsel. Traditionally, the independent counsel's 
purpose under the Ethics in Government Act was "to investigate, and, if 
appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government officials for viola-
tions of federal criminallaws."250 An independent counsel could "be removed 
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal 
action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical or mental 
disability or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of 
such independent counsel's duties."251 Following the Ethics in Government 
Act's expiration in 1999, the DO] replaced the independent counsel with an 
ad hoc special counsel. U.S. Attorney Patrick ]. Fitzgerald, the special 
counsel currently investigating the leak of CIA agent Valerie Plame's 
identity, "exercise[s] ... authority as Special Counsel independent of the 
supervision or control of any officer of the Uustice] Department."251 In effect, 
250. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988) . 
251. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a). The attorney general must simultaneously file a report with the 
Special Division and Congress "specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such 
removal," id. § 596(a)(2), and the independent counsel can obtain judicial review of his removal, 
id. § 596(a)(3 ). 
252. Letter from James B. Corney, Acting Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. 
Attorney (Dec. 30, 2003) (on file with author); see also Letter from James B. Corney, Acting 
Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney (Feb. 6, 2004) (on file with author) (clarifying 
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the office of special counsel constitutes a miniature OOJ with only tenuous 
ties to the White House. Barring extraordinary circumstances, an independent 
or special counsel's tenure runs until he or she concludes that the investigation 
. 1 211 ts camp ete. 
In widely publicized investigations, a special counsel may face tremen-
dous pressure to indict on insubstantial evidence or to use the prosecutorial 
machinery as a partisan tool to embarrass and harass the object of investiga-
tion.214 Adversarial testing and jury deliberation arguably have a weaker salu-
tary effect for special counsel investigations of high-level governmental 
officials, because pre-indictment decisions regarding the investigation's scope 
can deliver crippling political blows long before a grand jury or petit jury ever 
enters the picture. Indeed, the dangers of prosecutorial discretion are par-
ticularly acute for independent and special-counsel investigations precisely 
because the political costs associated with these investigations frequently 
equal or exceed individual criminal penalties. In the eyes of many critics, this 
combination of prosecutorial independence, discretion, and pressure to indict 
makes the special counsel the poster child for agency illegitimacy.211 
Since the special counsel enjoys greater independence from presidential 
control than regular federal prosecutors, ordinary due process restraints on 
prosecutorial discretion may be insufficient to ensure fidelity to the purpose of 
that the special counsel's authority over the investigation is plenary) ; 28 U.S.C. *§ 593, 594(a) 
(providing for appointment of independent counsel by a panel of circuit court judges, and delegating 
"full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and 
powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of 
the Department of Justice") . 
253. See 28 U.S. C. § 596(b)( I )-(2); see also Morrison , 487 U.S. at 712-15 ( 1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that this unconstrained discreticm comes ar a high financial and political cost). 
254. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the \XIrong Lessons from History: Why There Must Be 
an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. I, 4 (2000) (mguing that Kenneth Starr's role 
in the first Bush administration made it "inevitable" that the Monica Lewinsky investigation would 
be viewed as a "partisan" vendetta). 
255. For representative criticism of the independent-counsel office, see , for example, Carter, 
supra note 136, at 112-13 & n.27 (arguing that the independent counsel is accountable to no one 
but itself) (citing Alexander M. Bickel, Alexander M . Bickel on the Special Prosecutor, YALE L. REP., 
Winter 1974, at 24); Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 601 ( 1998); Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional 
Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1999); Thomas S. Martin & David E. Zerhusen, Independent 
Counsel-Checks and Balances, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536 ( 1990); see a lso David Johnston & 
Neil A. Lewis, Inquiry on Clinton Official Ends with Accusations of Cover-up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2006, at AI (observing that independent counsel David M. Barrett's investigation of former 
Housing Secretary Henry G . Cisneros "lasted more than a decade, consumed some $21 million and 
came to be a symbol of the flawed effort to prosecute high-level corruption through the use of 
independent prosecutors"). 
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the special-counsel investigation.256 Therefore, courts should take their cue 
from private fiduciary law and hold that due process requires the special 
counsel to meet a higher standard of care, loyalty, and transparency than rank-
and-file federal prosecutors. In addition, federal legislation or DO] regulations 
could be adopted to ensure that each special counsel keeps detailed records, 
makes targeted public disclosures, and provides the court and the target of 
investigation with a reasoned explanation for key discretionary judgments, 
such as the decision to focus an investigation on particular individuals or to 
seek indictments for specific offenses. These discretionary decisions might then 
be subject to challenge at trial under an "arbitrary-and-capricious" test or an 
equivalent standard. If the record produced by the special counsel should 
reveal that the investigatory process had been exploited for private or partisan 
advantage, courts could dismiss the indictment as an abuse of discretion 
pending the appointment of a new special counsel. These and other enhanced 
restraints on the special counsel's exercise of discretion would help to 
compensate for diminished political accountability by cementing the social 
norms of rationality, impartiality, and transparency as effective constraints on 
prosecutorial discretion. 
In short, the fiduciary model strongly supports strengthening administra-
tive agencies' constitutional and statutory duties of care, loyalty, and trans-
parency to enhance agency legitimacy in contexts where the political 
branches' residual control over agency performance is at its weakest. How 
256. Recognizing that prosecutorial discretion "carries with it the potential for both individual 
and institutional abuse," Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978), courts apply the Due 
Process Clause as a prohibition against vindictive, retaliatory, facially discriminatory, or other 
flagrantly abusive exercises of prosecutorial discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 , 
842-43 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Prosecutors are expected to recuse 
themselves from cases in which they have a personal interest. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 
713 (4th Cir. 1967) ("At common law, a prosecuting attorney 'is the representative of the public 
in whom is lodged a discretion ... , which is not to be controlled by the courts or by an interested 
individual."') (citation omitted). Due process also proscribes facially irrational or bad-faith exercises 
of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) 
(holding that failure to disclose a promise of immunity to a cooperating witness requires 
reversal); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding that suppression of material evidence 
justifies a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that due process violated "when the State, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears"); Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all . . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one."). In practice, these constitutional restraints on prosecutorial discretion-which address 
only the most egregious abuses-perform a function similar to the duties of care and loyalty in 
private fiduciary law. 
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administrative law should define and enforce these fiduciary duties in any 
particular context will naturally depend upon a host of factors, not the least 
of which are the scope of the agency's authority, residual political controls, 
and social norms. The fiduciary model's overarching theme, however, is that 
the political branches' residual control and agencies' duties of care and loyalty 
are mutually reinforcing forces, which must be harmonized to realize adminis-
trative law's ultimate goal-agency fidelity. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has excavated administrative law's fiduciary foundations to 
explore how the rhetoric and theory of fiduciary obligation shape administra-
tive law. The fiduciary model envisions administrative law as resting upon a 
foundation of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duties. In contrast 
to prevailing theories of administrative law such as the interest-representation 
model and unitary-executive model, the fiduciary model does not pin its 
hopes for agency fidelity on any single facet of the law, whether it be exper-
tise, legislative delegation, executive control, interest representation, or pro-
cedural rationality. Instead, the fiduciary model incorporates each and every 
one of these elements as mutually reinforcing supports in the administrative 
state's open-textured legal architecture. 
By the same token, the fiduciary model does not shy away from adminis-
trative agencies' diversity. While some agencies wield core executive powers 
and perform roles akin to agents in private law, other agencies function more 
like trustees, corporate directors, guardians, or other fiduciary relations. The fidu-
ciary model shows that the diverse species of agency discretion reflect 
competing visions of agency fidelity, from majoritarian pluralism to commu-
nitarian commitment reinforcement. Although the fiduciary model does not 
dictate how policymakers should choose from among these competing visions, 
it does furnish a useful conceptual framework for negotiating the enduring 
tensions shared by all agencies-trust and distrust, legal rules and social norms, 
public will and public interest, independence and accountability. 
